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Conformity and Dissent
Cass R. Sunstein*

Abstract
Much of the time, human beings do what others do. This is perfectly sensible, because the
actions and statements of other people convey valuable information about what should be
done. In addition, most people want the good opinion of others, and this desire promotes
conformity. But conformity can lead both groups and institutions in unfortunate and
even catastrophic directions. The most serious problem is that by following others, people
fail to disclose what they know and believe, thus depriving society of important
information. Those who dissent, and who reject the pressures imposed by others, perform
valuable social functions, often at their own expense, material or nonmaterial. These
points are illustrated by reference to theoretical and empirical work on conformity,
cascades, and group polarization. An understanding of the role of conformity and dissent
casts new light on a variety of legal issues, including the expressive function of law; the
institutions of the American constitution; the functions of free speech in wartime; the
debate over the composition of the federal judiciary; and affirmative action in higher
education.

“If I were to choose between living in a society which enjoys freedom of
expression, but not having the right myself, or enjoying the right in a society
which does not have it, I would have no hesitation in judging that my own
personal interest is better served by the first option.”1

Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. For valuable comments, I am grateful to
Jacob Gersen, Reid Hastie, David Hirshleifer, Christine Jolls, Catharine MacKinnon, Martha
Nussbaum, Susan Moller Okin, Eric Posner, Richard Posner, Lior Strahilevitz, Adrian Vermeule,
and Richard Zeckhauser.
1 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain 39 (1994).
*

“As soon as a person is in the midst of a group he is no longer indifferent
to it. He may stand in a wholly unequivocal relation to an object when alone; but
as soon as a group and its direction are present he ceases to be determined solely
by his own coordinates. In some way he refers the group to himself and himself
to the group. He might react to the group in many different ways; he might
adopt its direction, compromise with it, or oppose it; he might even decide to
disregard it. But even in the latter instance (which superficially seems to be an
‘absence of group influence’) there is a clear and determined reference to the
group as fully as in the preceding cases.”2
“Justice Marshall brought a special perspective. . . . His was the mouth of
a man who knew the anguish of the silenced and gave them a voice. . . . I have
been perhaps most personally affected by Justice Marshall as a raconteur . . . .
Occasionally, at Conference meetings, I still catch myself looking expectantly for
his raised brow and his twinkling eye, hoping to hear, just once more, another
story that would, by and by, perhaps change the way I see the world.”3
“A child, however, who had no important job and could only see things as
his eyes showed them to him, went up to the carriage. ‘The Emperor is naked,’ he
said.”4
“[W]hile individual ideology and panel composition both have important
effects on a judge’s vote, the ideology of one’s colleagues is a better predictor of
one’s vote than one’s own ideology.”5

I. Introduction
How do people influence each other? What are the social functions of
dissenters, malcontents, and skeptics? How do the answers to these questions
bear on law and policy, and on the design of private and public institutions?
Consider some clues:
Solomon Asch, Social Psychology 483 (1952).
See Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 Stan. L. Rev.
1217, 1217, 1220 (1992).
4 See Hans Christian Anderson, The Emperor’s New Suit, in Hans Christian Anderson, Shorter
Tales (Jean Hersholt trans. 1948; originally published 1837).
5 Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the DC Circuit, 83 Va L Rev 1717,
1764 (1997).
2
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—A large number of judicial votes and decisions were investigated to see
if it matters whether a panel, on a federal court of appeals, includes two judges,
or instead three, appointed by a President of the same party.6 It is tempting to
suggest that this should not matter at all; two judges, after all, are able to
produce a majority decision. But this suggestion turns out to be wrong. A panel
with three judges appointed by Republican presidents is much more likely than a
panel with two to reverse an environmental decision at the behest of an industry
challenger.7 A group of three like-minded judges behaves very differently from a
group with more diverse views. No less remarkably, a single Democratic judge,
sitting with two Republicans, turns out to be more likely to vote in favor of an
industry challenge to a regulation than a single Republican, sitting with two
Democrats.8 It is not entirely wrong to conclude that when sitting with
Republicans, Democratic judges vote like Republicans, and that when sitting
with Democrats, Republican judges vote like Democrats. But this conclusion is
itself misleading, because how Democrats vote, and how Republicans vote, is
very much dependent on whether they are sitting with one or two judges
appointed by presidents of the same party.9
—Ordinary citizens were asked to say, as individuals, how much a
defendant should be punished for specified misconduct.10 Their responses were
measured on a scale of 0 to 8, where 0 meant no punishment at all and 8 meant
“extremely severe” punishment.11 After recording their individual judgments,
people were sorted into six-person juries, which were asked to deliberate and to
reach unanimous verdicts. When the individual jurors favored little punishment,
the group showed a "leniency shift," meaning a rating that was systematically
lower than the median rating of individual members before they started to talk
The statements in this paragraph are based on my independent research, presented below, and
on Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the DC Circuit, 83 Va L Rev 1717,
1755 (1997). To the same effect, see Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and
Obedience to Legal Doctrine, 107 Yale LJ 2155 (1998) (finding that a panel of three Republican
judges is far more likely to reject agency action, in order to reach a conclusion that would be
predicted of that panel on political grounds, than a panel of two Republicans and one Democrat).
7 See the data discussed below; see also Revesz, supra note, at 1754-55 (also finding that a panel of
three judges appointed by the president of the same party behaves differently from a panel with
judges appointed by presidents of different parties) .
8 See id. at 1752.
9 Id. at 1752, 1754.
10 See David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars, 100
Colum L Rev 1139 (2001).
11 Id. at 1150.
6
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with one another.12 But when individual jurors favored strong punishment, the
group as a whole produced a "severity shift," meaning a rating that was
systematically higher than the median rating of individual members before they
started to talk.13 The direction and the extent of the shift were determined by the
median ranking of individual jurors, and because one or two dissenters from the
majority view could shift the median, they could make a significant difference.
My principal claim in this Article is that for each of us, conformity is often
a rational course of action, but when all or most of us conform, society can end
up making large mistakes. One reason we conform is that we often lack much
information of our own, and the decisions of others provide the best available
information about what should be done.14 The central problem is that
widespread conformity deprives the public of information that it needs to have.
Conformists are often thought to be protective of social interests, keeping quiet
for the sake of the group, while dissenters tend to be seen as selfish
individualists, embarking on projects of their own. But in an important sense, the
opposite is closer to the truth. In many situations, dissenters benefit others, while
conformists benefit themselves.
In a well-functioning democracy, institutions reduce the risks that
accompany conformity, in part because they meet conformity with dissent, and
hence increase the likelihood that more information will emerge, to the benefit of
all. A high-level official during World War II attributed the successes of the
Allies, and the failures of Hitler and the other Axis powers, to the greater ability
of citizens in democracies to scrutinize and dissent, and hence to improve past
and proposed courses of action.15 Dissent and scrutiny were possible because
skeptics were not punished by the law and because informal punishments, in the
form of social pressures, were relatively weak. I will suggest that an
understanding of group influences, and their potentially harmful effects, casts
new light on a wide range of issues, including the nature of the American

Id. at 1152, 1154-55.
Id.
14 See the discussion of imitation as a fast and frugal heuristic in Joseph Henrich et al., What Is the
Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality, in Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox 343, 344
(Gerd Gigerenzer and Richard Selten eds. 2002) (“Cultural transmission capacities allow
individuals to shortcut the costs of search, experimentation, and data processing algorithms, and
instead benefit from the cumulative experience stored in the minds (and observed in the
behavior) of others.”).
15 See Luther Gulick, Administrative Reflections from World War II (1948). Irving Janis,
Groupthink (2d ed. 1985), can be seen as a generalization of this theme.
12
13
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constitutional structure; the functions of bicameralism; the sources of ethnic
hostility and political radicalism; the importance of civil liberties in wartime and
during social panics and witch-hunts; the performance of juries; the effects of
diversity on the federal judiciary; affirmative action in higher education; and the
potentially large consequences of law even when it is never enforced.
Throughout I focus on two influences on individual belief and behavior.
The first involves the information conveyed by the actions and statements of
other people. If a number of people seem to believe that some proposition is true,
there is reason to believe that that proposition is in fact true. Most of what we
think—about facts, morality, and law—is a product not of first-hand knowledge,
but of what we learn from what others do and think. This is true even though
they too may be merely following the crowd. As we shall see, this phenomenon
can create serious problems for the system of precedent, as when courts of
appeals follow previous courts that are in turn following their predecessors,
creating a danger of widespread, self-perpetuating error. And of course some
people have more influence than others, simply because the decisions of those
people convey more information; we are especially likely to follow those who
have special expertise, those who seem most like us, those who fare best, or those
whom we otherwise have reason to trust.16
The second influence is the pervasive human desire to have and to retain
the good opinion of others. If a number of people seem to believe something,
there is reason not to disagree with them, at least not in public. The desire to
maintain the good opinion of others breeds conformity and squelches dissent,
especially but not only in groups that are connected by bonds of affection, which
can therefore impair group performance. We shall see that close-knit groups,
discouraging conflict and disagreement, often do badly for that very reason. In
any case much of human behavior is a product of social influences. For example,
employees are far more likely to file suit if members of the same workgroup have
also done so17; teenage girls who see that other teenagers are having children are
more likely to become pregnant themselves18; the perceived behavior of others

See Daniel Goldstein et al., Why and When Do Simple Heuristics Work?, in Bounded
Rationality, note supra, at 174–76; Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson, Norms and Bounded
Rationality, in id. at 284–87.
17 See Harold H. Gardner, Nathan L. Kleinman, and Richard J. Butler, Workers’ Compensation
and Family and Medical Leave Act Claim Contagion, 20 J Risk and Uncertainty 89, 101–110 (2000)
18 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, Janet L. Yellen & Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock
Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q.J. Econ. 277 (1996).
16
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has a large effect on the level of violent crime19; broadcasters mimic one another,
producing otherwise inexplicable fads in programming20; lower courts
sometimes do the same, especially in highly technical areas, and hence judicial
mistakes may never be corrected.21
We should not lament social influences or wish them away. Much of the
time, people do better when they take close account of what others do. Some of
the time, we even do best to follow others blindly. But social influences also
diminish the total level of information within any group, and they threaten,
much of the time, to lead individuals and institutions in the wrong directions.
Dissent can be an important corrective; many groups and institutions have too
little of it.22 As we shall see, conformists are free-riders, whereas dissenters often
confer benefits on others; and it is tempting to free-ride. As we shall also see,
social pressures are likely to lead groups of like-minded people to extreme
positions. When groups become caught up in hatred and violence, it is rarely
because of economic deprivation23 or primordial suspicions24; it is far more often
a product of the informational and reputational influences discussed here.25
Indeed, unjustified extremism frequently results from a “crippled epistemology,”
in which extremists react to a small subset of relevant information, coming
mostly from one another.26

See Edward Glaeser, E. Sacerdote, and Jose Scheinkman, Crime and Social Interactions, 111
Quarterly Journal of Economics 507 (1996).
20 See Robert Kennedy, Strategy Fads and Strategic Positioning: An Empirical Test for Herd
Behavior in Prime-Time Television Programming, J. Industrial Economics (2002).
21 See Andrew F. Daughtety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment, 1 Am Law and
Ec. Rev. 158 (1999).
22 Hence Mill’s claim that “the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is
robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the
opinion, stil more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the
opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit,
the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.” John
Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on
Representative Government 85 (H.B. Acton ed. 1972)
23 See Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism:
Is There a Causal Connection? (unpublished manuscript 2002).
24 See Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27
J Legal Stud 623, 648 (1998).
25 See Cass R. Sunstein, Why They Hate Us: The Role of Social Dynamics, 25 Harv J Law and
Public Policy 429 (2002).
26 See Russell Hardin, The Crippled Epistemology of Extremism, in Political Rationality and
Extremism 3, 16 (Albert Breton et al. eds. 2002).
19
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Similar processes occur in less dramatic forms. Many large-scale shifts
within legislatures, bureaucracies, and courts are best explained by reference to
social influences. When a legislature suddenly shows concern with some
formerly neglected problem—for example, hazardous waste dumps or corporate
misconduct—the concern is often a product of conformity effects, not of real
engagement with the problem. Of course the new concern might be justified. But
if social influences are encouraging people to conceal information that they have,
or if the blind are leading the blind, serious problems are likely. There is a further
point. With relatively small "shocks," similar groups can be lead, by social
pressures, to dramatically different beliefs and actions. When societies differ, or
when large-scale changes occur over time, the reason often lies not where we
usually look, but in small and sometimes elusive factors.27
An appreciation of informational influences, and of people’s concern for
the good opinion of others, helps to show how, and when, law can alter behavior
without being enforced—and merely by virtue of the signal that it provides.28
The central point here is that law can provide reliable evidence both about what
should be done and about what most people think should be done. In either case,
it can convey a great deal of relevant information.29 Consider bans on public
smoking and on sexual harassment. If people think that the law is speaking for
the view of most or all, potential violators are less likely to engage in smoke or to
engage in sexual harassment. Potential victims are also more likely to take the
steps to enforce the law privately, as, for example, through reminding people of
their legal responsibilities, and insisting that violators come into compliance. In
this light we can better understand the much-disputed claim that the law has an
“expressive function.”30 By virtue of that function, law can even stop or
See Joseph Henrich, What is the Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality?, in Bounded
Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox 353-54 (2001), for an entertaining outline in connection with
food choice decisions. For example: “Many Germans believe that drinking water after eating
cherries is deadly; they also believe that putting ice in soft drinks is unhealthy. The English,
however, rather enjoy a cold drink of water after some cherries; and Americans love icy
refreshments. ” Id. at 353. See also Paul Omerod, Butterfly Economics (1993), for a popular
account.
28 See Robert Kagan and Jerome Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcement,
in Smoking Policy (Robert Rabin and Stephen Sugarman eds.) (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993).
29 See Richard McAdams, Norms Theory: An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 Oregon L.
Rev. 339 (2000).
30 Mathew Adler, Expressivist Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U Pa L Rev 1363
(2000); Symposium, The Expressive Dimension of Governmental Action: Philosophical and Legal
Perspectives, 60 Maryland L. Rev. 465 (2001).
27
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accelerate a social cascade.31 Here too the areas of cigarette smoking and sexual
harassment are relevant examples. But if would-be violators are part of a
dissident subcommunity, they might well be able to resist law’s expressive effect;
fellow dissidents can band together and encourage one another to violate the
law. Indeed, informational and reputational factors can even encourage
widespread noncompliance, as, for example, in drug use and failure to comply
with the tax laws.32 The law’s expressive power is partly a function of its moral
authority, and when law lacks that authority within a subcommunity, its signal
may be irrelevant or even counterproductive.
This Article is divided into seven parts. Parts II, III, and IV investigate
social science evidence involving, respectively, conformity, cascades, and group
polarization. A unifying theme is that in all three contexts, individuals are
suppressing their private signals—about what is true and what is right—and that
this suppression can cause significant social harm. Groups of like-minded people
are especially vulnerable on this count. Part V focuses on the expressive function
of law and in particular on the phenomenon of “compliance without
enforcement.” Part VI catalogues some implications of social influences for
constitutionalism, judicial confirmations, and affirmative action in higher
education. Here I urge that the principal contribution of the framers of the
American Constitution lay not in their endorsement of deliberative democracy,
but in their insistence that diversity is an affirmative good, likely to improve
deliberation. This enthusiasm for diversity helps account for the systems of
checks and balances and federalism. I also suggest that it is important to attempt
to provide a mix of views on the federal bench; indeed, consideration should be
given to increasing the likelihood that panels, on courts of appeals, contain
judges appointed by president of different parties. I urge as well that in those
cases in which racial diversity will improve discussion, it is entirely legitimate
for colleges and universities to attempt to promote racial diversity. Part VII is a
brief conclusion.
II.

Conformity and Independence

Why, and when, do people do what others do? To answer this question,
we need to distinguish between hard questions and easy ones. Intuition suggests

See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. Chi.
L. Rev 607 (2000).
32 See Robert Kagan and Jerome Skolnick, in Banning Smoking: Compliance Without
Enforcement, in Smoking Policy: Law, Politics, and Culture 78 (Robert Radin ed. 1999).
31
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that when people are confident that they are right, they will be more willing to
do what they think best and to reject the views of the crowd. Several sets of
experiments confirm this intuition, but they also offer some significant twists.
Most important, they suggest three points that I will emphasize throughout:
1. Those who are confident and firm will have particular influence, and can lead
otherwise identical groups in dramatically different directions.33
2. People are extremely vulnerable to the unanimous views of others and hence
a single dissenter, or voice of sanity, is likely to have a huge impact.34
3. If people are, by our lights, from some kind of “out group,” they are far less
likely to influence us, even on the simplest questions.35 And if people are part
of a group to which we also belong, they are far more likely to influence us,
on both easy and hard questions.36
My ultimate goal is to see how these points bear on the behavior of those
involved in making, enforcing, and interpreting law. But let us begin by
reviewing some classic studies.
A. Hard Questions
In the 1930s, the psychologist Muzafer Sherif conducted some simple
experiments on sensory perception.37 Subjects were placed in a very dark room
and a small pinpoint of light was positioned at some distance in front of them.
Because of a perceptual illusion, the light, which was actually stationary,
appeared to move. On each of several trials, Sherif asked people to estimate the
distance that the light had moved. When polled individually, subjects did not
agree with one another, and their answers varied from one trial to another. This
is not surprising; because the light did not move, any judgment about distance
was a stab in the dark. But Sherif found some striking results when subjects were
See p. below.
See p. below. Note a parallel finding: A minority is especially likely to have influence if it
consists of more than one person and if all members of the minority group are in basic
agreement. See Robert Baron et al., Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action 81-82 (1999).
35 Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What to think By Knowing Who You Are: Self-Categorization
and he Nature of Norm Formation, Conformity, and Group Polarization, 29 British J. Soc. Psych.
97 (1990). Group membership and self-categorization are emphasized in John Turner et al.,
Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory 42-67 (1987).
36 Dominic Abrams et al., supra note, at 97-110.
37 Muzafer Sherif, An Experimental Approach to the Study of Attitudes, 1 Sociometry 90 (1937). A
good outline can be found in Lee Ross and Richard Nisbet, The Person and the Situation 28-30
(1991).
33
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asked to act in small groups. Here the individual judgments converged and a
group norm, establishing the right distance, quickly developed. Indeed, the norm
remained stable within groups across different trials, thus leading to a situation
in which different groups made, and were committed to, quite different
judgments.38 There is an important clue here about how similar groups, indeed
similar nations, can converge on very different beliefs and actions simply
because of modest and even arbitrary variations in starting points.
When Sherif added a confederate—his own ally, unbeknownst to
subjects—something else happened.39 The judgment of the confederate, typically
much higher or much lower than those made by individual subjects, helped
produced correspondingly higher or lower judgments within the group. The
large lesson is that at least in cases involving difficult questions of fact,
judgments “could be imposed by an individual who had no coercive power and
no special claim to expertise, only a willingness to be consistent and unwavering
in the face of others’ uncertainty.”40 Perhaps more remarkable still, the group’s
judgments became thoroughly internalized, so that subjects would adhere to
them even when reporting on their own, even a year later, and even when
participating in new groups whose members offered different judgments.41 The
initial judgments were also found to have effects across “generations.” In an
experiment in which fresh subjects were introduced and others retired, so that
eventually all participants were new to the situation, the original group
judgment tended to stick, even after the person who was originally responsible
for it had been long gone.42
What accounts for these results? The most obvious answer points to the
informational influences produced by other people’s judgments. After all, the
apparent movements are a perceptual illusion, and the system of perception does
not readily assign distances to those movements. In those circumstances, people
are especially likely to be swayed by a confident and consistent group member.
This finding has implications outside of the laboratory and for classrooms,
courtrooms, bureaucracies, and legislatures. If uninformed people are trying to
decide whether global warming is a serious problem, or whether they should be

Id. at 29.
Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 29-30.
38
39
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concerned about existing levels of arsenic in drinking water, they are likely to be
responsive to the views of confident and consistent others.43
What is true for factual issues is true for moral, political, and legal issues
as well. Suppose that a group of legislators is trying to decide how to handle a
highly technical issue. If a “confederate” is planted among the group, showing
considerable confidence, she is highly likely to be able to move the group in his
preferred direction. So too if she is not a confederate at all, but simply an
ordinary legislator with great confidence on the issue at hand. If judges are
trying to resolve a complex issue on which they lack certainty, they too are
vulnerable to conformity effects.44 And for judicial panels as well, Sherif-type
effects can be expected on technical matters if one judge is confident and seems
expert. The problem is that the so-called specialists may have biases and agendas
of their own, leading to large errors. Note that there is an important qualification
to these claims, to which I will return: Sherif’s conformity findings significantly
decrease if the experimenter uses a confederate whose membership in a different
social group is made salient to subjects.45
B. Easy Questions
But what if perception does provide reliable guidance? What if people
have good reason to know the right answer? The leading experiments, conducted
by Solomon Asch, explored whether people would be willing to overlook the
apparently unambiguous evidence of their own senses.46 In these experiments,
the subject was placed into a group of seven to nine people who seemed to be
other subjects in the experiment but who were actually Asch’s confederates. The
simple task was to “match” a particular line, shown on a large white card, to one
of the three “comparison lines” that was identical to it in length. The two nonmatching lines were substantially different, with the differential varying from an
inch and three quarters to three quarters of an inch.

See the discussion of authority in Robert Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion 20836 (1993). For evidence that minority views can be influential if they are held by consistent,
confident people, see Robert Bray et al., Social Influence By Group Members With Minority
Opinions, 43 J Personality and Social Psych. 78 (1982).
44 See section below.
45 Abrams, supra note, at 99-104.
46 See the overview in Solomon Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in Readings About the Social
Animal 13 (Elliott Aronson ed. 1995).
43
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In the first two rounds of the Asch experiments, everyone agrees about the
right answer. “The discriminations are simple; each individual monotonously
calls out the same judgment.”47 But “suddenly this harmony is disturbed at the
third round.”48 All other group members make what is obviously, to the subject
and to any reasonable person, a clear error, matching the line at issue to one that
is conspicuously longer or shorter. In these circumstances, the subject, in all cases
showing initial confusion and disbelief at the apparent mistakes of others, has a
choice: He can maintain his independent judgment or instead accept the view of
the unanimous majority. A large number of people end up yielding at least once
in a series of trials. When asked to decide on their own, subjects erred less than
1% of the time; but in rounds in which group pressure supported the incorrect
answer, subjects erred 36.8% of the time.49 Indeed, in a series of twelve questions,
no less than 70% of subjects went along with the group, and defied the evidence
of their own senses, at least once.50 Conformity experiments of this kind have
now produced 133 total sets of results from seventeen countries, including Zaire,
Germany, France, Japan, Lebanon, and Kuwait.51 A meta-analysis of these studies
uncovers a variety of refinements on Asch’s basic findings, but his basic
conclusion has held up. For all results, the mean percentage error is 29%.52 People
in some nations, with “conformist” cultures, do err more than people in other
nations, with more “individualist” cultures.53 The variations are real, but the
overall pattern of errors—with subjects conforming between 20% and 40% of the
time—does not show huge differences across nations.
Note that Asch’s findings contain two conflicting lessons. First, a
significant number of people are independent all or much of the time. About 25%
of people are consistently independent,54 and about two-thirds of total individual
answers do not conform. Hence “there is evidence of extreme individual
differences” in susceptibility to group influences, with some subjects remaining
completely independent, and others “going with the majority without
exception.”55 While independent subjects “present a striking spectacle to an
Solomon Asch, Social Psychology 453 (1952).
Asch, Opinion and Social Pressures, supra note, at 13.
49 Id. at 16.
50 Id.
51 See Rod Bond and Peter Smith, Culture and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of Studies Using
Asch’s Line Judgment Task, 119 Psych. Bulletin 111, 116 (1996).
52 Id. at 118.
53 Id. at 128.
54 Ronald Friend et al., A Puzzling Misinterpretation of the Asch “Conformity” Study, 20
European J of Social Psych 29, 37 (1990).
55 Solomon Asch, Social Psychology, supra note, at 457-58.
47
48
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observer,” giving “the appearance of being unshakable,”56 other people show a
great deal of anxiety and confusion.57 Second, most subjects, at least some of the
time, are willing to yield to the group even on an apparently easy question on
which they have direct and unambiguous evidence. For present purposes, the
latter finding is the most important.
C. Reasons and Blunders
Why do people sometimes ignore the evidence of their own senses? The
two principal explanations involve information and peer pressure. Some of
Asch’s subjects seem to have thought that the unanimous confederates must be
right; but other people, though believing that group members were
unaccountably mistaken, were unwilling to make, in public, what those members
would see as an error. In Asch’s own studies, several conformists said, in private
interviews, that their own opinions must have been wrong58—a point that
suggests that information, rather than peer pressure, is what was moving them.59
This informational account is strengthened by one study in which people
recorded their answers anonymously but gave nearly as many wrong answers as
they had under Asch’s own conditions.60 A similar study finds that conformity is
not lower when the subject’s response is unavailable to the majority.61 On the
other hand, these are unusual results, and experimenters generally find
significantly reduced error, in the same basic circumstances as Asch’s
experiments, when the subject is asked to give a purely private answer.62 In the
same way, easily identifiable conformity or deviation has been found to produce
higher conformity.63 These findings suggest that peer pressure matters as well.
Asch’s own conclusion was that his results raised the possibility that “the
social process is polluted” by the “dominance of conformity.”64 He added, “That
we have found the tendency to conformity in our society so strong that
reasonably intelligent and well-meaning young people are willing to call white
Id. at 466.
Id. at 470.
58 See Asch, supra.
59 It would be possible to question this explanation, however, on the ground that some of these
conformists might have been embarrassed to admit that they were vulnerable to peer influence,
entirely apart from a belief that the peers might have been right.
60 See Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance 149-50 (2000).
61 Bond and Smith, supra note, at 124.
62 See Aronson, supra note, at 23-24.
63 See Robert Baron et al., Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action 66 (1999).
64 Asch, supra note, at 21.
56
57

13

black is a matter of concern.”65 As I have noted, Asch’s experiments produce
broadly similar findings across nations, and so in Asch’s sentence just quoted,
the word “society” could well be replaced with the word “world.” But I want to
stress another point here: Many people are not willing to disclose their own
information to the group, even though it is in the group’s interest, most of the
time, to learn what it is known or thought by individual members. To see this
point, imagine a group almost all of whose members believe something to be
true even though it is false. Imagine too that one member of the group, or a very
few members of the group, know the truth. Are they likely to correct the
dominant view? If Asch’s findings generalize, the answer is that they may not be.
They are not reticent because they are irrational. They are making is a perfectly
sensible response to the simple fact that the dominant view is otherwise—a fact
that suggests either that the small minority is wrong or that they are likely to risk
their own reputations if they insist that they are right. As we shall see, Asch’s
findings help explain why groups can end up making unfortunate and even selfdestructive decisions.
Would those findings apply to judgments about morality, policy, and
law? It seems jarring to think that people would yield to a unanimous group
when the question involves a moral, political, or legal issue on which they have
great confidence. But if Asch is correct, such yielding should be expected, at least
some of the time. We will find powerful evidence that this happens within
federal courts of appeals.66 The deadening effect of public opinion was of course
a central concern of John Stuart Mill, who insisted that protection “against the
tyranny of the magistrate is not enough,” and that it was also important to
protect “against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the
tendency of society to impose, by other mans than civil penalties, its own ideas
and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them . . .”67 Mill’s
focus here is on the adverse effects of coerced conformity not only on the
individuals who are thus tyrannized, but also on society itself, which is deprived
of important information.68

Id.
See below.
67 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on
Representative Government 73 (H.B. Acton ed. 1972).
68 See id. at 72-76.
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D. How To Increase (or Decrease) Conformity
What factors increase or decrease conformity? Consistent with Sherif’s
findings, people are less likely to conform if they have high social status or are
extremely confident about their own views.69 They are more likely to conform if
the task is difficult or if they are frightened.70 Consider also the following:
1. Financial rewards for correct answers affect performance, and in two
different ways.71 When people stand to make money if they are right, the rate of
conformity is significantly decreased in the same basic condition as the Asch
experiments, if the task is easy. People are less willing to follow group members
when they stand to profit from a correct answer. But there is a striking difference
when the experiments are altered to make the underlying task difficult. In that
event, a financial incentive, rewarding correct answers, actually increases
conformity. People are more willing to follow to crowd when they stand to profit
from a correct answer if the question is hard. Perhaps most strikingly, the level of
conformity is about the same, when financial incentives were absent, in lowdifficulty and high-difficulty tasks—but the introduction of financial rewards
splits the results on those tasks dramatically apart, with significantly decreased
conformity for low-difficulty tasks and significantly-increased conformity for
high-difficulty tasks.72
These results have simple explanations. A certain number of people, in the
Asch experiments, actually know the right answer, and give conforming answers
only because it is not worthwhile to reject the shared view of others in public.
But when a financial incentive is offered, peer pressure is outweighed by the
possibility of material gain. The simple lesson here is that an economic reward
can counteract the effects of social pressures. By contrast, difficult tasks leave
people with a great deal of uncertainty about whether they are right. In such
circumstances, people are all the more likely to give weight to the views of
others, simply because those views are the most reliable source of information.
Consider in this regard the parallel finding that people’s confidence in their own
judgments is directly related to the confidence shown by the experimenter’s
confederates.73 When the confederates act with confidence and enthusiasm,
See Robert Baron et al., Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action 66 (1999).
Id.
71 See Robert Baron et al., The Forgotten Variable in Conformity Research: Impact of Task
Importance on Social Influence, 71 J Personality and Social Psych. 915 (1996).
72 Id. at 923.
73 Id.
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subjects also show heightened confidence in their judgments, even when they
were simply following the crowd. Consider also the general claim that imitation
of most other people can operate as a kind of fast and frugal heuristic, one that
works well for many creatures, including human beings, in a wide variety of
settings.74 Like most heuristics, the imitation heuristic, while generally sensible
and often the best available, also produces errors in many situations.75
There is a disturbing implication. A “majority consensus” is “often
capable of misleading individuals into inaccurate, irrational, or unjustified
judgments.” Such a consensus “can also produce heightened confidence in such
judgments as well.” 76 It follows that “so long as the judgments are difficult or
ambiguous, and the influencing agents are united and confident, increasing the
importance of accuracy will heighten confidence as well as conformity—a
dangerous combination.”77 The point very much bears on the sources of
unjustified extremism, especially under circumstances in which countervailing
information is unavailable.78 The same point helps explain group influences
within the federal courts.79
2. Asch’s original studies found that varying the size of the group of
confederates, unanimously making the erroneous decision, mattered only up to a
number of three; increases from that point had little effect.80 Using one
confederate did not increase subjects’ errors at all; using two confederates
increased errors to 13.6%; and using from three confederates increased error to
31.8%, not substantially different from the level that emerged from further
increases in group size. But Asch’s own findings appear unusual on this count.
Subsequent studies have found that, contrary to Asch’s own findings, increases
in the size of the group of confederates usually do increase conformity.81
More significantly, a modest variation in the experimental conditions
made all the difference: the existence of at least one compatriot, or voice of
sanity, dramatically reduced both conformity and error. When one confederate
See Daniel Goldstein et al., Why and When Do Simple Heuristics Work?, in Bounded
Rationality, supra note, at 174.
75 See id.
76 Baron et al., supra note, at 925.
77 Id. at 925.
78 See Hardin, supra note.
79 See below.
80 Asch, supra note.
81 Baron, supra note, at 119-20.
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made a correct match, errors were reduced by three-quarters, even if there was a
strong majority the other way.82 There is a clear implication here: If a group is
embarking on an unfortunate course of action, a single dissenter might be able to
turn it around, by energizing ambivalent group members who would otherwise
follow the crowd. It follows that affective ties among members, making even a
single dissent less likely, might well undermine the performance of groups and
institutions. Consider here a study of the performance of investment clubs—
small groups of people who pool their money to make joint decisions about stock
market investments.83 The worst-performing clubs were built on affective ties
and primarily social; the best-performing clubs limited social connections and
were focused on increasing returns. Dissent was far more frequent in the highperforming clubs. The low performers usually had unanimous votes, with little
open debate. The problem is that the votes in low performing groups were “cast
to build social cohesion rather than to make the best financial choice.”84 In short,
conformity resulted in significantly lower returns.
3. Much depends on the subject’s perceived relationship to the
experimenters’ confederates and in particular on whether the subject considers
himself part of the same group in which those confederates fall. If the subject
identified himself as a member of a different group from the majority, the
conformity effect is greatly reduced.85 People are especially likely to conform
when the group consists of people whom subjects like or admire, or otherwise
identify with.86 The general point explains why group membership is often
emphasized by those who seek to increase or decrease the influence of a certain
point of view. Perhaps an advocate can be discredited, without the relevant
group, by showing that he is a “conservative” or a “liberal,” prone to offer
unacceptable views.
Thus conformity—and hence error—is dramatically increased, in public
statements, when the subject perceives himself as part of a reasonably discrete
Id. at 18. The finding here is reminiscent of the tale of The Emperor’s New Clothes, in which a
single voice of sanity was necessary and sufficient to expose the truth. See Hans Christian
Anderson, The Emperor’s New Suit, in Hans Christian Anderson, Shorter Tales (Jean Hersholt
trans. 1948; originally published 1837).
83 Brooke Harrington, Cohesion, Conflict and Group Demography (unpublished manuscript
2000),
84 Id.
85 Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What To Think By Knowing Who You Are, 29 Brit J Soc Psych
97, 104-110 (1990).
86 Baron et al., supra, at 66. The point is stressed at various places in Turner, supra note; see, e.g.,
pp. 151-170.
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group that includes the experimenter’s confederates (all, like himself, psychology
majors, for example).87 By contrast, conformity is dramatically decreased, and
hence error is also dramatically decreased, in public statements when the subject
perceives himself as in a different group from the experimenter’s confederates
(all but himself ancient history majors, for example).88 Notably, private opinions,
expressed anonymously afterwards, were about the same whether or not the
subject perceived himself as a member of the same group as others in the
experiment. And people who thought that they were members of the same group
as the experimenter’s confederates gave far more accurate answers, and far less
conforming answers, when they were speaking privately.89 In the real world,
would-be dissenters might silence themselves partly when and because they
trust group members to be right, partly because they do not want to risk the
opprobrium of like-minded others, and partly because they fear that they will,
through their dissent, weaken the effectiveness and reputation of the group to
which they belong. There is a large lesson here. Publicly expressed statements,
showing agreement with a majority view, may be both wrong and insincere,
especially when relevant speakers identify themselves as members of the same
group as the majority.90 The finding of heightened conformity is linked with
evidence of poor performance by groups whose members are connected by
Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What To Think By Knowing Who You Are, 29 Brit J Soc Psych
97, 106-08 (1990).
88 Id.
89 See Abrams et al., supra note, at 108. By contrast, people who thought that they were members
of a different group actually gave more accurate, nonconforming answers when speaking
publicly, which creates an interesting puzzle: Why was there more accuracy in public than in
private statements? The puzzle is solved if we consider the likelihood that subjects could consider
it an affirmative good to disagree with people from another group (even if they secretly
suspected that those people might be right). In the real world, this effect may well be heightened
when people are asked whether they agree with opponents or antagonists; they might well say
“no” even when the answer is “yes,” simply because agreement carries costs, either to reputation
or to self-conception.
There is a noteworthy finding about the nature of minority influences: They have a
larger impact on people’s privately expressed views than on their publicly expressed views. See
Baron et al., supra note, at 79-80. For example, minority members who express enthusiasm for
gay rights, or opposition to gay rights, affect anonymous opinions more than publicly stated
opinions. See id. at 80. This point has obvious implications for the effects of secret votes and
ballots.
90 Consider the fact that the least conformity, and the greatest accuracy, was found when people
who thought of themselves in a different group were speaking publicly. At the same time, the
largest number of conforming, inaccurate responses came when people thought of themselves in
the same group and were speaking publicly -- even though the number of inaccurate private
responses in that experimental condition was not notably higher than in other conditions. See
Abrams et al., supra note, at 108.
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affective ties; in such groups, people are less likely to say what they know and
more likely to suppress disagreement. A system of checks and balances,
attempting to ensure that ambition will check ambition,91 can be understood as a
way of increasing the likelihood of dissent, and of decreasing the likelihood that
members of any particular group, or institution, will be reluctant to disclose what
they think and know.92
E. Shocks, Authority, and Expertise
In the Sherif and Asch experiments, no particular person has special
expertise. No member of the group shows unusual measurement abilities or
wonderful eyesight. But we might safely predict that subjects would be even
more inclined to blunder if they had reason to believe that one or more of the
experimenters’ confederates was particularly likely to be correct. This hypothesis
receives support from a possible interpretation of one of the most alarming
findings in modern social science, involving conformity not to the judgments of
peers, but to the will of an experimenter.93 These experiments are of independent
interest, because they have implications for social influences on judgments of
morality, not merely facts.

THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("Ambition must
be made to counteract ambition.").
92 There are other noteworthy findings about the Asch experiments. For example, cultures that
are traditionally described as collectivist show greater conformity effects than cultures that are
traditionally described as individualist. “On the basis of our discussion, we would expect
differences in susceptibility to social influence between individualist and collectivist cultures to
be even greater when the task was, for example, an opinion issue.” Bond and Smith, supra note,
at 128. Since the 1950s, there has been a linear reduction in conformity, suggesting that over time
people have become more willing to reject the views of the majority. Id. at 129. Women are more
likely to conform than men. Id. at 130. The latter finding is worth emphasizing; it fits well with
the general finding that members of low-status groups are less likely to speak out within
heterogeneous organizations. See Caryn Christenson and Ann Abbott, Team Medical Decision
Making, in Decision Making in Health Care (Gretchen Chapman and Frank Sonnenberg eds.
2000), at 267, 273-76. This last point suggests the importance of creating mechanisms to ensure
that low-status people speak and are heard. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble: Why
Groups Go To Extremes, 110 Yale L.J. 71 (2000).
93 This unconventional interpretation is set out in Thomas Blass, The Milgram Paradigm After 35
Years: Some Things We Now Know About Obedience to Authority, in Obedience to Authority:
Critical Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm 35, 38-44 (Thomas Blass ed. 1999). Shiller, supra
note, at 150-51.
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The experiments, conducted by the psychologist Stanley Milgram, ask
people to administer electric shocks to a person sitting in an adjacent room.94
Subjects are told, falsely, that the purpose of the experiment is to test the effects
of punishment on memory. Unbeknownst to the subject, the victim of the electric
shocks is a confederate and there are no real shocks. The apparent shocks are
delivered by a simulated shock generator, offering thirty clearly delineated
voltage levels, ranging from 15 to 450 volts, accompanied by verbal descriptions
ranging from “Slight Shock” to “Danger: Severe Shock.”95 As the experiment
unfolds, the subject is asked to administer increasingly severe shocks for
incorrect answers, to and past the “Danger: Severe Shock” level, which begins at
400 volts.
In Milgram’s original experiments, the subjects included forty men
between the ages of 20 and 50. They came from a range of occupations, including
engineers, high school teachers, and postal clerks.96 They were paid $4.50 for
their participation—and also told that they could keep the money no matter how
the experiment went. The “memory test” involved remembering word pairs;
every mistake, by the confederate/victim, was to be met by an electric shock and
a movement to one higher level on the shock generator. To ensure that
everything seems authentic, the subject is, at the beginning of the experiment,
given an actual sample shock at the lowest level. But the subject is also assured
that the shocks are not dangerous, with the experimenter declaring, in response
to a prearranged question from the confederate, “Although the shocks can be
extremely painful, they cause no permanent tissue damage.”97
In the original experiments, the victim does not make any protest until the
300-volt shock, which produces a loud kick, by the victim, on the wall of the
room where he is bound to the electric chair. After that point, the victim does not
answer further questions, and is heard from only after the 315-volt shock, when
he pounds on the wall again—and is not heard from thereafter, even with
increases in shocks to and past the 400-volt level. If the subject indicates an
unwillingness to continue, the experimenter offers prods of increasing firmness,
from “Please go on” to “You have no other choice; you must go on.”98 But the
experimenter has no power to impose sanctions on subjects.
See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, in Readings About the Social Animal 23
(7th ed. 1995).
95 Id. at 24.
96 Id. at 25.
97 Id. at 27.
98 Id. at 29.
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Most people predict that in such studies, over 95% of subjects would
refuse to proceed to the end of the series of shocks. When people are asked to
make predictions about what people would do, the expected breakoff point is
“Very Strong Shock,”99 of 195 volts. But in Milgram’s experiment, every one of
the forty subjects went beyond 300 volts. The mean maximum shock level was
405 volts; and a strong majority—26 of 40, or 65%—went to the full 450-volt
shock, two steps beyond “Danger: Severe Shock.” 100
Later variations on the original experiments produced even more
remarkable results. In those experiments, the victim expresses a growing level of
pain and distress as the voltage increases.101 Small grunts are heard from 75 volts
to 105 volts, and at 120 volts, the subject shouts, to the experimenter, that the
shocks were starting to become painful. At 150 volts, the victims cries out,
“Experimenter, get me out of here! I won’t be in the experiment any more! I
refuse to go on!”102 At 180 volts, the victim says, “I can’t stand the pain.” At 270
volts he responds with an agonized scream. At 300 volts he shouts that he will no
longer answer the questions. At 315 volts he screams violently. At 330 volts and
after, he is not heard. In this version of the experiment, there is no significant
change in Milgram’s results: 25 of 40 participants went to the maximum level,
and the mean maximum level was over 360 volts. In a somewhat gruesome
variation, the victim says, before the experiment begins, that he has a heart
condition, and his pleas to discontinue the experiment include repeated reference
to the fact his heart is “bothering” him as the shocks continue.103 This too did not
lead subjects to behave differently.104
Milgram himself explains his results as showing obedience to authority, in
a way reminiscent of the behavior Germans under Nazi rule; and indeed
Milgram was partly motivated by the goal of understanding how the Holocaust
could have happened.105 Milgram concluded that ordinary people will follow
orders even if the result is to produce great suffering in innocent others.
Undoubtedly simple obedience is part of the picture. But there is another
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101 Id. at 23 (1974).
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explanation.106 Subjects who are invited to an academic setting, to participate in
an experiment run by an apparently experienced scientist, might well defer to the
experimenters’ instructions in the belief that the experimenter is likely to know
what should be done, all things considered. If the experimenter asks subjects to
proceed, most subjects might believe, not unreasonably, that the harm
apparently done to the victims is not serious and that the experiment actually has
significant benefits for society. On this account, the experimenter has special
expertise. If this is right, then the participants in the Milgram experiments might
be seen as similar to those in the Asch experiments, with the experimenter
having a greatly amplified voice. And on this account, many of the subjects
might have put their moral qualms to one side, not because of blind obedience,
but because of a judgment that those qualms are likely to have been ill-founded.
That judgment might be based in turn on a belief that the experimenter is not
likely to ask subjects to proceed if the experiment is truly objectionable.
In short, Milgram’s subjects might be responding to an especially loud
informational signal—the sort of signal sent by a specialist or a crowd. And on
this view, Milgram was wrong to draw an analogy between the behavior of his
subjects and the behavior of Germans under Hitler. His subjects were not simply
obeying a leader, but responding to someone whose credentials and good faith
they thought they could trust. Of course it is not simple, in theory or in practice,
to distinguish between obeying a leader and accepting the beliefs of an expert.
The only suggestion is that the obedience of subjects was hardly baseless; it
involved a setting in which subjects had some reason to think that the
experimenter was not asking them to produce serious physical harm out of
sadism or for no reason at all.
A subsequent study, exploring the grounds of obedience, offers support
for this claim.107 In that study, a large number of subjects watched the tapes of the
Milgram experiments, and were asked to rank possible explanations for
compliance with the experimenter’s request. Deference to expertise was the
highest-rank option. This is not definitive, of course, but an illuminating
variation on the basic experiment, by Milgram himself, provides further
support.108 In this variation, the subject is among three people asked to
administer the shocks, and two of those people, actually confederates, refuse to
go past a certain level (150 volts for one and 210 volts for the other). In such
See Blass, supra note; Shiller, supra note.
Blass, supra note, at 42-44.
108 Milgram supra note, at 113-122.
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cases, the overwhelming majority of subjects, 92.5%,defy the experimenter.109
This was by far the most effective of Milgram’s many variations on his basic
study, all designed to reduce the level of obedience.110
Why was the defiance of peers so potent? I suggest that the subjects, in
this variation, were very much like those subjects who had at least one
supportive confederate in Asch’s experiments. One such confederate led Asch’s
subjects to say what they saw; so too, peers who acted on the basis of conscience
freed Milgram’s subject to follow their consciences as well. Milgram himself
established, in yet another variation, that without any advice from the
experimenter, and without any external influences at all, the subject’s moral
judgment was clear: do not administer shocks above a very low level.111 Indeed
that moral judgment had nearly the same degree of clarity, to Milgram’s subjects,
as the clear and correct factual judgments made by Asch’s subjects when they
were deciding about the length of lines on their own (and hence not confronted
with Asch’s confederates). In Milgram’s experiments, it was the experimenter’s
own position—that the shocks should continue and that no permanent damage
would be done—that had a high degree of influence, akin to the influence of the
Asch’s unanimous confederates. But when the subject’s peers rejected the
position of Milgram’s experimenter, the informational content of that position
was effectively negated by the information presented by the refusals of peers.
Hence subjects could rely on their own moral judgments, or even follow the
moral signals indicated by the peers’ refusals.
The general lessons are not obscure. When the morality of a situation is
not clear, people might well be influenced by someone who seems to be a expert,
able to weigh the risks involved. But when the expert’s questionable moral
judgment is countered by reasonable people, who bring their own moral
judgments to bear, most people are unlikely to follow experts. They are far more
likely to do as their conscience dictates. As we shall see, compliance with law has
similar features. A legal pronouncement about what should be done will often
operate in the same way as an expert judgment about what should be done. It
follows that people will follow the law even when it is hardly ever enforced—
and even if they would otherwise be inclined to question the judgment that the
law embodies. But if peers are willing to violate the law, violations may become
widespread, especially but not only if people think that the law is enjoining them
Id. at 119.
Id. at 118.
111 Id.
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from doing something that they wish to do, either for selfish reasons or for
reasons of principle. In this way, Milgram’s experiments offer some lessons
about when law will be ineffective unless vigorously enforced—and also about
the preconditions for civil disobedience.
III. Cascades
I now examine how informational and reputational influences can
produce social cascades—large-scale social movements in which many people
end up thinking something, or doing something, because of the beliefs or actions
of a few early movers. As in the case of conformity, participation in cascades is
fueled by social influences. But where the idea of conformity helps to explain
social stability, an understanding of cascades helps to explain social and legal
movements, which can be stunningly rapid, and which can also produce
situations that are highly unstable.
Cascades can involve judgments about facts or values. They operate
within legislatures and the judicial system as well as within groups of citizens.
And when people have affective connections with one another, the likelihood of
cascades increases. In the area of social risks, cascades are especially common,
with people coming to fear certain products and processes not because of private
knowledge, but because of the apparent fears of others.112 The system of legal
precedent also produces cascades, as early decisions lead later courts to a certain
result, and eventually most or all courts come into line, not because of
independent judgments, but because of a decision to follow the apparently
informed decisions of others.113 The sheer level of agreement will be misleading if
most courts have been influenced, even decisively influenced, by their
predecessors, especially in highly technical areas.
By themselves cascades are neither good nor bad. It is possible that the
underlying processes will lead people to sound decisions about risks, morality,
or law. The problem, a serious one, is that people may well converge, through
the same processes, on erroneous or insufficiently justified outcomes. But to say
this is to get ahead of the story; let us begin with the mechanics.

See Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan L
Rev 683, 703-05 (1999).
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A. Informational Cascades: The Basic Phenomenon
In an informational cascade, people cease relying, at a certain point, on
their private information or opinions. They decide instead on the basis of the
signals conveyed by others. Once this happens, the subsequent actions, made by
few or many others, add no new information. It follows that the behavior of the
first few actors can, in theory, produce similar behavior from countless followers.
A particular problem arises if people think that the large number of people who
say or do something are acting on independent knowledge; this can make it very
hard to stop the cascade.
1. A simple illustration. Begin with a stylized example, and suppose that
doctors are deciding whether to prescribe hormone therapy for menopausal
women. If hormone therapy creates significant risks of heart disease, its net
value, let us assume, is –1; if it does not create such risks, its net value is +1.114 Let
us also assume that the doctors are in a temporal queue, and each doctor knows
his place on that queue. From his own experience, each doctor has some private
information about what should be done. But each doctor also cares, rationally,
about the judgments of others. Anderson is the first to decide, and prescribes
hormone therapy if his judgment is low risk but declines if his judgment is high
risk. Suppose that Anderson prescribes. Barber now knows that Anderson’s
judgment was low risk and that she too should certainly urge hormone therapy if
she makes that independent judgment. But if her independent judgment is that
the risk is high, she would—if she trusts Anderson no more and no less than she
trusts herself—be indifferent about whether to prescribe, and might simply flip a
coin.
Now turn to a third doctor, Carlton. Suppose that both Anderson and
Barber have prescribed hormone therapy, but that Carlton’s own information
suggests that the risk is high. In that event, Carlton might well ignore what he
knows and prescribe the therapy. It is likely, in these circumstances, that both
Anderson and Barber saw a low risk, and unless Carlton thinks that his own
information is better than theirs, he should follow their lead. If he does, Carlton
is in a cascade. To the extent that Carlton is not acting on the basis of his own
information, and to the extent that subsequent doctors know what others have
done and why, they will do exactly what Carlton did: prescribe hormone therapy
regardless of their private information. “Since opposing information remains
I draw here on David Hirschleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind, in The New Economics of
Human Behavior 188, 193-94 (Marianno Tommasi and Kathryn Ierulli eds.,1995);
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hidden, even a mistaken cascade lasts forever. An early preponderance toward
either adoption or rejection, which may have occurred by mere coincidence or for
trivial reasons, can feed upon itself . . .”115
Notice that the serious problem here lies in the fact that for those in a
cascade, actions do not disclose privately held information. In the example just
given, doctors’ actions will not reflect the overall knowledge, or the aggregate
knowledge, of the health consequences of hormone therapy—even if the
information held by individual doctors, if actually revealed and aggregated,
would give a quite accurate picture of the situation. The reason for the problem is
that individual doctors are following the lead of those who came before. As
noted, this problem is aggravated if subsequent doctors overestimate the extent
to which their predecessors relied on private information and did not merely
follow those who came before. If this is so, subsequent doctors might fail to rely
on, and fail to reveal, private information that actually exceeds the information
collectively held by those who started the cascade. The problem here is that the
medical profession generally will lack information that it needs to have.
Participants in cascades act rationally in suppressing their private information,
whose disclosure would benefit the group more than the individual who has it.116
The failure to disclose private information therefore presents a free-rider
problem. To overcome that problem, some kind of institutional reform seems to
be necessary.
Of course cascades do not always develop, and of course they usually do
not last forever. Often people have, or think that they have, enough private
information to reject the accumulated wisdom of others. Medical specialists
sometimes fall in this category. When cascades develop, they might be broken by
corrective information, as has apparently happened in the case of hormone
replacement therapy itself.117 In the domain of science, peer-reviewed work
provides a valuable safeguard. But even among specialists and indeed doctors,
cascades are common. “Most doctors are not at the cutting edge of research; their
inevitable reliance upon what colleagues have done and are doing leads to
numerous surgical fads and treatment-caused illnesses.”118 Thus an article in the
prestigious New England Journal of Medicine explores “bandwagon diseases” in
which doctors act like “lemmings, episodically and with a blind infectious
Id. at 195.
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117 Gina Kolata, “Risk of Breast Cancer Halts Hormone Replacement Study,” New York Times, at
http://site.mumsweb.com/article.php?sid=759 (July 11, 2002).
118 Hirshleifer, supra note, at 204.
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enthusiasm pushing certain diseases and treatments primarily because everyone
else is doing the same.”119 Some medical practices, including tonsillectomy,
“seem to have been adopted initially based on weak information,” and extreme
differences in tonsillectomy frequencies (and other procedures) provide good
evidence that cascades are at work.120 And once several doctors join the cascade,
it is liable to spread. There is a link here with Sherif’s experiments, showing the
development of divergent but entrenched norms, based on group processes in
areas in which individuals lack authoritative information. In fact, prescriptions of
hormone replacement therapy were fueled by cascade-like processes.121
What is true for doctors is highly likely to be true for lawyers, engineers,
legislators, bureaucrats, judges, investors,122 and academics123 as well. It is easy to
see how cascades might develop among groups of citizens, especially but not
only if those groups are small, insulated, and connected by affective ties. If Barry
does not know whether global warming is a serious problem, and if Alberta
insists that it is, Barry might well be persuaded, and their friend Charles is likely
to go along, making it unlikely that Danielle will be willing to reject the shared
judgment of the developing group. When small communities of like-minded
people end up fearing a certain risk, or fearing and hating another group,
cascades are often responsible.
2. Precedential cascades. Consider a legal analogue124: There is a disputed
issue under the Endangered Species Act. The first court of appeals to decide the
question finds the issue genuinely difficult, but resolves the issue favorably to
the government. The second court of appeals favors, very slightly, the view that
the government is wrong, but the holding of another circuit is enough to tip the
scales in the government’s favor. A third court of appeals is also slightly
predisposed to rule against the government, but it lacks the confidence to reject
the shared view of two circuits. Eventually all circuits come into line, with the
final few feeling the great weight of the unanimous position of others, and
perhaps insufficiently appreciating the extent to which that weight is a product
John F. Burnham, 317 New England Journal of Medicine 1220, 1201 (1987).
See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and
Informational Cascades, 12 J Econ Persp 151, 167 (1998).
121 Tim O’Shea, “The Creation of a Market: How Did the Whole HRT Thing Get Started in the
First Place?” at www.mercola.com/2001/jul/4/hrt5.htm (July 2001).
122 See Hirshleifer, supra note, at 205; Shiller, supra note.
123 See Cass R. Sunstein, On Academic Fads and Fashions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1251 (2001).
124 Cf. Andrew F. Daughtety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment, 1 Am Law and
Ec. Rev. 158 (1999).
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of an early and somewhat idiosyncratic judgment. Because the courts of appeals
are in agreement, the Supreme Court denies certiorari.
To be sure, precedential cascades do not always happen, and splits among
courts of appeals are common.125 One reason is that subsequent courts often have
sufficient confidence to conclude that predecessor courts have erred. But it is
inevitable that cascades will sometimes develop, especially in highly technical
areas, and it will be hard to detect them after they have occurred. The
prescriptive implication is clear: Judicial panels should be cautious about giving
a great deal of weight to the shared view of two or more courts of appeals. A
patient who seeks a second opinion does well not to disclose the first opinion to
his new doctor, so as to ensure independence; so too, a court of appeals should
be alert to the possibility that the unanimity of previous courts does not reflect
independent agreement. And when the Supreme Court rejects the unanimous
view of a large number of courts of appeals, a precedential cascade might well
have been responsible for the unanimity.126 For the legal system, the danger is
that a cascade, producing agreement among the lower courts, might prove selfinsulating as well as self-reinforcing. Unless there is clear error, why should the
Supreme Court become involved?
3. Rationality and error. In informational cascades as discussed thus far,
each participant is being entirely rational; they are acting as they should in the
face of limited information. But as I have suggested, it is possible that
participants in the cascade will fail to see the extent to which the decisions of
their predecessors carry little independent information. If most scientists think
that global warming is a serious problem, can they really be wrong? A possible
answer is that they might indeed be wrong, especially if they are not relying on
their private information and are following the signals sent by other people. And
people often seem to mistake a cascade for a series of separate and independent
judgments. In 2001, for example, hundreds of law professors signed a statement
condemning, on constitutional grounds, President Bush’s decision to permit
military tribunals to try suspected terrorists.127 The sheer number of signatures
seems extremely impressive. But it is perhaps less so if we consider the
likelihood that most signatories lacked reliable information on the esoteric legal
issue in question, and were simply following the apparently reliable but actually
uninformative judgment of numerous others.
See Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 So. Cal. L. Rev. 87 (1999).
See Daughety and Reinganum, supra note, at 161-65.
127 See XX
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Despite the rationality of those who participate in informational cascades,
there is a serious risk of error. People might easily converge on an erroneous,
damaging, or dangerous path, simply because they are failing to disclose and to
act on the basis of all the information that they have.128
4. Laboratory evidence. Cascades are easy to create in laboratory settings.
Some of the experiments are detailed and a bit technical, but four general lessons
are clear. First, people will often neglect their own private information and defer
to the information provided by their predecessors. Second, people are alert to
whether their predecessors are especially informed; more informed people can
shatter a cascade. Third, and perhaps most intriguingly, cascade effects are
greatly reduced if people are rewarded not for correct individual decisions, but
for correct decisions by a majority of the group to which they belong. Fourth,
cascade effects, and blunders, are significantly increased if people are rewarded
not for correct decisions, but for decisions that conform to the decisions made by
most people. As we shall see, these general lessons have implications for
institutional design. They suggest that errors are most likely when people are

See Hirchleifer, supra note, at 204-05 (discussing evidence from medicine and science). This
suggestion does not mean that when people participate in cascades, they do worse than they
would do if they did not see the decisions of their predecessors. In some cases, they do better.
Imagine if the early movers have relatively good information, or are lucky, and if the later
decisionmakers have little information, or are systematically confused. In such situations,
cascades will make the situation better than it would be if prior decisions were not observed. Lisa
Anderson and Charles Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 Am Econ Rev 847, 852
(1997), showing four sessions in which people did better because they did not rely on their
private information. But we could also imagine situations in which the early movers do not have
especially good information, or are unlucky, and in which later decisionmakers have fairly good
information. In those situations, independent judgments would produce far better outcomes than
cascade behavior. See id., showing a session in which a cascade produced more error s than
would have resulted from reliance on private information. As compared with non-observation,
cascades systematically produce greater variance, simply because the early movers have so much
influence. See Edward Parson, Richard Zeckhauser, and Cary Coglianese, Collective Silence and
Individual Voice: The Logic of Information Games, forthcoming in Collective Choice: Essays in
Honor of Mancur Olson (J. Heckelman and D. Coates eds. 2003); Eric Posner, Four Economic
Perspectives on American Labor Law and the Problem of Social Conflict, J. of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics (forthcoming 2003). But it cannot be said, in the abstract, that cascades
produce greater inaccuracy than non-observation.
In short, the basic claim is not that those who participate in cascades generally do worse
than those who cannot observe the choices of others. The claim is instead that those who
participate in cascades fail to disclose information that they have, and that as a result, they
produce worse outcomes than would result if people revealed that information.
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rewarded for conforming, and least likely when people are rewarding for
helping groups and institutions to decide correctly.
The simplest experiment asked subjects to guess whether the experiment
was using Urn A, which contained two red balls and one white, or Urn B, which
contained two white balls and one red.129 In each period, the contents of the
chosen urn were emptied in a container. A randomly selected subject was asked
to make one (and only one) private draw of a ball. After that draw, the subject
recorded, on an answer sheet, the color of the draw and his own decision about
the urn. The subject’s draw is not announced to the group, but the subject’s
decision about the urn is disclosed. Then the urn is passed to the next subject for
his own private draw, which is not disclosed, and his own decision about the
urn, which is disclosed. This process continued until all subjects had made
decisions, and at that time the experimenter announced the actual urn used.
Subjects could earn $2 for a correct decision.
In this experiment, cascades often developed. After a number of
individual judgments were revealed, people sometimes announced decisions
that were inconsistent with their private draw, but that fit with the majority of
previous announcements.130 Over 77% of “rounds” resulted in cascades, and 15%
of private announcements did not reveal a “private signal,” that is, the
information provided by people’s own draw. Consider cases in which one
person’s draw (say, red) contradicted the announcement of his predecessor (say,
Urn B). In such cases, the second announcement nonetheless matched the first
about 11% of the time—far less than a majority, but enough to ensure occasional
cascades. And when one person’s draw contradicted the announcement of two
or more predecessors, the second announcement was likely to follow those who
went before. Notably, the majority of decisions followed Bayes’ rule, and hence
were rationally based on available information131—but erroneous cascades were

See Lisa Anderson and Charles Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 Am Econ Rev
847 (1997).
130 See Angela Hung and Charles Plott, Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to
Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions, 91 Am Econ Rev 1508, 1515 (2001).
131 Thus 72% of subjects followed Bayes’ rule in the Anderson/Holt experiment, and 64% in Marc
Willinger and Anthony Ziegelmeyet, Are More Informed Agents Able To Shatter Information
Cascades in the Lab, in The Economics of Networks: Interaction and Behaviours 291, 304 (Patrick
Cohendet et al. eds. 1996).
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nonetheless found. Here is an actual example of a cascade producing an
entertainingly inaccurate outcome (the urn used was B)132:

Private Draw
Decision

1
a
A

2
a
A

3
b
A

4
b
A

5
b
A

6
b
A

What is noteworthy here, of course, is that the total amount of private
information —four whites and two reds—justified the correct judgment, in favor
of Urn B. But the existence of two early signals, producing rational but incorrect
judgments, led all others to fall in line. “[I]nitial misrepresentative signals start a
chain of incorrect decisions that is not broken by more representative signals
received later.”133 It should be simple to see how this result might map onto realworld assessments of factual, moral, and legal issues, especially in insulated
groups, where external correction is less likely.
B. How To Make and Break Cascades
Is the likelihood of cascades affected by institutional arrangements and
social norms? Can legal arrangements diminish or increase the risk of erroneous
cascades, inadvertently or through conscious decision134? A central point here is
that in an informational cascade, everyone is equal; people are simply trying to
get the right answer; and people pay attention to the views and acts of others
only because they want to be right. But it is easy to imagine slight alterations of
the situation, so that some participants know more than others, or so that people
do not only care whether they are right. How would these alterations affect
outcomes?
1. Fashion leaders and informed cascade-breakers. In the real world of
cascades, “fashion leaders” have unusual importance.135 A prominent scientist
might declare that global warming is a serious problem; a well-respected
political leader might urge that war should be made against Iraq; a lawyer with
See Marc Willinger and Anthony Ziegelmeyet, Are More Informed Agents Able To Shatter
Information Cascades in the Lab, in The Economics of Networks: Interaction and Behaviours 291
(Patrick Cohendet et al. eds. 1996).
133 Anderson and Holt, supra note, at 859.
134 See Talley, supra note, for a suggestion that certain features of the legal system, including long
judicial tenures and non-opaque decisions, reduce the likelihood of bad cascades. Talley
persuasively shows that the likelihood is reduced – but not eliminated.
135 Hirshleifer, supra note, at 197-98.
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particular credibility might conclude that recent antiterrorist legislation violates
the Constitution. In any of these cases, the speaker provides an especially loud
informational signal, perhaps sufficient to start or to stop a cascade.
Now turn to the actions of followers. In the hormone therapy case, no
doctor is assumed to have, or to believe that she has, more information than her
predecessors. But in many cases, people know, or think that they know, a great
deal. It is obvious that such people are far less likely to follow those who came
before. Whether they will do so should depend on a comparison between the
amount of information provided by the behavior of predecessors and the amount
of private information that they have. And in principle, more informed people
will shatter cascades, possibly initiating new and better ones. Whether this will
happen, in practice, depends on whether the people who come later know, or
believe, that the deviant agent was actually well-informed. If so, the more
informed people operate as fashion leaders.
A simple study attempts to test the question whether more informed
people actually shatter cascades.136 The study was essentially the same as the urn
experiment just described, except that players had a special option after any
sequence of two identical decisions (for example, two “Urn A” decisions): They
could make not one but two independent draws before deciding. The other
subjects were informed of every case in which a player was making two draws.
The simplest finding is that this “shattering mechanism” did indeed reduce the
number of cascades—and thus significantly improved decisions.137 But the
mechanism did not work perfectly. In some cases, cascades were nonetheless
found. And in some cases, people who were permitted to draw twice, and saw
two different balls (say, one red and one white), concluded, irrationally, that the
cascade should be broken. The remarkable and somewhat disturbing outcome is
that they initiated an inaccurate cascade. Consider this evidence, in a case in
which the actual urn was A:

Private Draw
Decision

1
a
A

2
a
A

3
b, a
B

4
b
B

5
a
B

6
b
B

This disturbing pattern undoubtedly has real-world analogues, in which
people sometimes give excessive weight to their own information, even if that
136
137

Willinger and Ziegelmeyet, supra.
Id. at 305.
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information is ambiguous and in which it makes sense to follow the crowd. But
the larger point is the simple one: More informed people are less influenced by
the signals of others, and they also carry more influence themselves.
But what about cases in which fashion leaders are not necessarily more
informed, or in which they are seen by others as having more information, or
more wisdom, than they actually have? We can imagine self-styled experts—on
diets, or herbal foods, or alternative medicine, or economic trends—who
successfully initiate cascades. The risk here is that the views of fashion leaders
will be wrongly taken as authoritative. The result can be to lead people to errors
and even to illness and death. How can society protect itself? He answers lie in
good institutional arrangements, civil liberties, free markets, and good social
norms, encouraging people to be skeptical of supposed experts. In systems with
freedom of speech and free markets, it is always possible to debunk supposedly
authoritative sources. And within groups, it is possible to structure
decisionmaking so as to reduce the relevant risks. Votes might, for example, be
taken in reverse order of seniority, so as to ensure that less experienced people
will not be unduly influenced by the judgments of their predecessors; this is in
fact the practice on the United States Supreme Court.
2. Majority rule: rewarding correct outcomes by groups rather than by
individuals. How would the development of cascades be affected by an
institution that rewards correct answers not by individuals, but by the majority
of the group? In an intriguing variation on the urn experiment, subjects were
paid $2 for a correct group decision, and penalized $2 for an incorrect group
decision, with the group decision determined by majority rule.138 People were
neither rewarded nor punished for a correct individual decision. The result was
that only 39% of rounds saw cascades. In 92% of cases, people’s announcement
matched their private draw.139 And because people revealed their private signals,
the system of majority rule produced a substantial increase in fully informed
decisions—that is, the outcomes that someone would reach if he were somehow
able to see all private information in the system. A simple way to understand this
point is to assume that a group has a large number of members and that each
member makes an announcement that matches his private draw. As a statistical
matter, it is overwhelmingly likely that the majority’s position will be correct. As

138
139

Id. at 1511.
Id. at 1517.
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an example, consider this period from the majority rule experiment140 (the actual
urn was A):

Private
Draw
Decision

1
a

2
a

3
a

4
a

5
b

6
a

7
a

8
a

9
b

A

A

A

A

B

A

A

A

B

What is the explanation for this significantly reduced level of cascade
behavior in a system of majority rule? The answer lies in the fact that the
individual knows that he has nothing to gain from a correct individual decision
and everything to gain from a correct group decision. As a result, it is in the
individual’s interest to say exactly what he sees, because it is the accurate
announcement, from each person, that is most likely to promote an accurate
group decision.141
Note that to explain the effect of majority rule in producing better
outcomes, it is not necessary or even helpful to say that when the group decision
counts, people are altruistic or less concerned with their self-interest. On the
contrary, self-interest provides a fully adequate explanation of the people’s
behavior. In the individual condition, it is sensible to care little about the
accuracy of one’s signal to others; that is an informational externality142—
affecting others, for better or for worse, but not affecting one’s own likelihood of
gain. If a subject’s individual signal misleads others, the subject has no reason to
care. But under the majority rule condition that I have just described, the subject
should care a great deal about producing an accurate signal, simply because an
inaccurate signal will reduce the likelihood that the group will get it right. And
here the subject need not care about the accuracy of his individual decision
except insofar as that decision provides a helpful signal to the group. Hence it is
only to be expected that cascades are reduced, and correct outcomes are
increased, when people are rewarded for good group decisions.
There is a general point here. It is individually rational, under plausible
assumptions, to participate in a cascade; participants benefit themselves at the
same time that they fail to benefit others (by failing to disclose privately held
Id. at 1515.
Note that it takes quite sophisticated participants to see this point.
142 See Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externalities and
Search, 108 Econ. J. 60, 61 (1998).
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information) or affirmatively harm others (by giving them the wrong signal).
This claim holds even if conformity is not rewarded as such. By contrast, it is not
rational, under plausible assumptions, to disclose or act upon private
information, even though the disclosure or action will actually benefit others.
The upshot is that dissenters, disclosing their own private information, need to
be encouraged, simply because they confer benefits on those who observe them.
If the point is put together with an emphasis on the risk of cascades on courts,
there is fresh reason to appreciate judicial dissents, if only because they increase
the likelihood that majority decisions will receive critical scrutiny. Note here that
within the Supreme Court alone, dissenting opinions have frequently become the
law, indeed have become the law on well over 130 occasions143—a point to which
I will return.
The upshot is that dissenters and nonconformists, disclosing their own
private information, should be encouraged, simply because they confer benefits
on those who observe them. Now let us put this point together with a
recognition of the risk of cascades on courts. We can readily see a new reason to
appreciate judicial dissents, if only because they increase the likelihood that
majority decisions will receive critical scrutiny. Note here that within the
Supreme Court alone, dissenting opinions have frequently become the law,
indeed have become the law on well over 130 occasions144—a point to which I
will return.
This claim has an implication for appropriate institutional arrangements:
Any system that creates incentives for individuals to reveal information to the
group is likely to produce better outcomes. A system of majority rule, in which
individuals known that their well-being will be promoted (or not) depending on
the group’s decision, therefore has significant advantages. Well-functioning
organizations, public as well as private, are likely to benefit from this insight. In
this light, we might even offer a suggestion about the nature of civic
responsibility: In case of doubt, citizens should reveal their private signal, rather
than disguising that signal and agreeing with the crowd. Perhaps
counterintuitively, this kind of behavior is not optimal from the point of view of
the individual who seeks to get things right, but it is best from the point of view
of a group or nation that seeks to use all relevant information.

Calculated on the basis of the list of overruled decisions in
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/constitution/scourt.html.
144 Calculated on the basis of the list of overruled decisions in
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/constitution/scourt.html.
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3. Disclosers, dissenters, and contrarians. It is important to make some
distinctions here. The majority-rewarding variation on the urn experiment gives
people an incentive to disclose accurate, privately-held information. This is the
information from which the group benefits, and this is the information that does
not emerge if people are rewarded for correct individual decisions. Full
disclosure of accurate information is a central goal of institutional design.145 But
the experiment does not suggest that a group is better off if people always
disagree, or even if they always say what they think. In the tale of the Emperor’s
New Clothes, the boy is not a skeptic or a malcontent. On the contrary, he is a
particular kind of dissenter; he is a discloser, revealing the information that he
actually holds. The majority-rewarding variation of the urn experiment
encourages subjects to act like that boy.
By contrast, we can imagine a different kind of person, a contrarian, who
feels that he will be rewarded, financially or otherwise, simply for disagreeing
with others. There is no reason to celebrate the contrarian. In many cases,
contrarians are most unlikely to give any help to the group. If the contrarian is
known as such, his signal will be very noisy and not very informative. If the
contrarian is not known as such, he is still failing to disclose accurate
information, and in that sense he is not helping the group to arrive at correct
decisions. We could imagine a variation on the urn experiment in which a
contrarian-confederate regularly announced the opposite of what his predecessor
announced. It is safe to predict that such behavior would reduce cascades, but it
would not reduce errors by individuals or groups. On the contrary, it would
increase them.

I do not explore the possibility that institutions might encourage or discourage people to
obtain information, which can then be disclosed to the group. Obviously a group will benefit if
its members are provided with good incentives to provide valuable information. Such incentives
are especially important if those who acquire information would otherwise incur all of the costs
of search but only a fraction of the benefits. And since it can be costly to obtain information, there
are tradeoffs to be made, for both individuals and groups, between the costs and benefits of
search. Throughout the discussion I emphasize the simplest situations, in which conformity and
cascades (along with group polarization) suppress accurate information that individuals already
hold. So long as that information is valuable to the group, full disclosure is generally the ideal. I
offer a brief discussion, see pp. infra, of the possibility that disclosure of accurate information will
harm the group, perhaps because it introduces tension, perhaps because it produces
embarrassment or worse. Much work remains to be done on the complex cases in which
institutions seek to promote either the optimal level of search or the optimal level of disclosure
when disclosure produces both benefits and harms.
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Dissenters who are disclosers, then, are to be prized. This is certainly if
they are disclosing the full truth about the issue at hand, and also if they are
revealing accurate information, bearing on that issue, that they actually hold. By
contrast, dissenters who are contrarians are at best a mixed blessing. And we can
also imagine dissenters who do not disclose a missing fact, but instead simply
state a point of view that would otherwise be missing from group discussion.
Such dissenters might urge, for example, that animals should have rights, or that
school prayer should be permitted, or that the law should allow homosexual
marriage, or that capital punishment should be banned. In the domains of
politics and law, cascade-type behavior typically leads people to be silent not
about facts, but about points of view. It is obvious that a group needs relevant
facts; does it need to know about privately held opinions as well?
There are two reasons that it does. First, those opinions are of independent
interest. If most or many people favor school prayer, or believe that capital
punishment is morally unacceptable, it is valuable to know that fact. Other
things being equal, both individuals and governments do better if they know
what their fellow citizens really think. Second, people with dissenting opinions
might well have good arguments. It is important for those who conform, or fall
into a cascade, or independently concur to hear those arguments. This is a
standard Millian point,146 to which I will shortly return. Judge Richard Posner
suggests that judges often offer a “go along concurrence,”147 joining the majority
though they privately disagree. Such judges give a false signal about their actual
opinions and, very possibly, their future votes.
4. Conformity and reputation. Suppose that people are rewarded not only
or not mostly for being correct, but also or mostly for doing what other people
do. The reward might be material, in the form of more cash or improved
prospects, or it might be non-material, in the form of more and better
relationships. In the real world, people are often punished for nonconformity
and rewarded for conformity. Someone who rejects the views of leaders or of the
majority, might well find himself less likely to be promoted and more likely to be
disliked. Organizations, groups, and governments often prize harmony, and
nonconformists tend to introduce disharmony. Sometimes it is more important to
be “on the team” than to be right. “Sometimes cultural groups adopt very high
levels of norm enforcement that severely suppress the individual variations,

146
147

See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, supra note.
See Richard Posner.
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innovations, and ‘errors’ that innate cultural transmission mechanisms require to
generate adaptive evolutionary processes within groups.”148
The likely result should be clear. If rewards come to those who conform,
cascade-like behavior will increase, simply because the incentive to be correct is
strengthened or replaced by the incentive to do what others do. The extent of this
effect will depend on the extent of the incentive to conform. But whenever the
incentive is positive, people will be all the more likely to ignore their private
information and to follow others. The opposite result should be expected if
people are penalized for following others or rewarded for independence; if so,
cascade-like behavior should be reduced or even eliminated. I am now
emphasizing the incentive to conform, but in some settings independence is
prized, and I will offer a few remarks on that possibility below.
If conformity is rewarded, the problem is especially severe for the earliest
disclosers or dissenters, who “may bear especially high costs because they are
conspicuous, individually identified, and easy to isolate for reprisals.”149 And if
the earliest dissenters are successfully deterred, dissent is likely to be exceedingly
rare. But once the number of disclosers or dissenters reaches a certain level, there
may be a tipping point, producing a massive change in behavior.150 Indeed a
single discloser, or a single skeptic, might be able to initiate a chain of events by
which a myth is shattered. Return to the tale of the Emperor’s New Clothes: “A
child, however, who had no important job and could only see things as his eyes
showed them to him, went up to the carriage. ‘The Emperor is naked,’ he said. . .
. [T]he boy's remark, which had been heard by the bystanders, was repeated over
and over again until everyone cried: ‘The boy is right! The Emperor is naked! It's
true!’”151 But it might be very difficult to initiate this process, especially if early
disclosers are subject to social or legal sanctions. Here we can see a potentially
beneficial role of misfits and malcontents, who should perform a valuable
function in getting otherwise neglected material and perspectives to others.
Consider the suggestion that extremely harmful cultural effects result from a
“social structure” that eliminates “valuable innovators, experimenters, and errorJoseph Henrich et al., supra note, at 356.
Parson, Zeckhauser, and Coglianese, supra note, at 31.
150 See Kuran, supra note; Christina Bicchieri and Yoshitaka Fukui, The Great Illusion: Ignorance,
Informational Cascades, and the Persistence of Unpopular Norms, in Experience, Reality, and
Scientific Explanation 89, 108-114 (M.C. Galavotti and A. Pagnini eds. 1999). For an engaging
discussion, see Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point (1999).
151 See Hans Christian Anderson, The Emperor’s New Suit, in Hans Christian Anderson, Shorter
Tales (Jean Hersholt trans. 1948; originally published 1837).
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makers from being viewed as people to copy.”152 The qualification, noted above,
is that regular contrarians might reduce cascades without reducing errors.153
a. An experiment. With respect to conformity, these speculations are
supported by an ingenious variation on the urn experiment mentioned above.154
In this experiment, people were paid twenty-five cents for a correct decision, but
seventy-five cents for a decision that matched the decision of the majority of the
group. There were punishments for incorrect and nonconforming answers as
well. If people made an incorrect decision, they lost twenty-five cents; if their
decision failed to match the group’s decision, they lost seventy-five cents.
In this experiment, cascades appeared almost all of the time. No fewer
than 96.7% of rounds resulted in cascades,155 and 35.3% of announcements did
not match the announcer’s private signal, that is, the signal given by his own
draw.156 And when the draw of a subsequent person contradicted the
announcement of the predecessor, 72.2% of people matched the first
announcement. Consider, as a dramatic illustration, this period of the
experiment157 (the actual urn for this period was B):
Conformity Experiment

Private
Draw
Decision

1
a

2
b

3
b

4
b

5
a

6
b

7
b

8
b

9
a

10
b

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

b. Affective ties and stifled dissent. The lesson is that institutions that
reward conformity, and punish deviance, are far more likely to produce worse
decisions and to reveal less in the way of private information. And here there is a
link to the earlier suggestion that serious mistakes are committed by groups
whose members are connected by bonds of affection, friendship, and

See Henrich et al., in Bounded Rationality, supra note, at 357.
See H. Henry Cao and David Hirshleifer, Misfits and Social Progress (unpublished manuscript
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solidarity.158 In such groups, members are usually less willing, or even unwilling,
to state objections and counterarguments, for fear that these will violate
generally held norms. Cascades and bad decisions are likely; return to the
investment clubs discussed above.159 We can see here that an organization that
depends on affective ties is likely to stifle dissent and to minimize the disclosure
of private information and belief; some religious and political organizations are
obvious illustrations. A socially destructive norm of conformity aggravates
people’s tendency to ignore their private information and to say and do what
others do.
If an organization wants to avoid error, it should make clear that it
welcomes the disclosure private signals, simply because that is in the
organization’s own general interest. This point might seem counterintuitive,
because in most well-functioning societies, conformity to the majority’s view
seems to be the civil thing to do. What I am suggesting here is that from the
social standpoint, it is better to behave in the way that one would if being right
were all that mattered, and better still to behave as one would if a correct group
decision were all that mattered.
Of course the normative issues are not simple. Bonds of affection and
solidarity are often important to group members, and many people do not
appreciate dissent and disagreement. Perhaps the real point of the relevant
group or organization is not to perform well, but to foster good relationships.
Conformists avoid creating the difficulties that come from contestation, but at the
expense, often, of a good outcome; dissenters tend to increase contestation while
also improving performance.160 In the abstract, it is hard to specify the optimal
tradeoffs between the various goods. If the central goal of group members is to
maintain and improve social bonds and not to carry out some task, conformity
might be encouraged, at least if nonconformists introduce tension and hostility.
Or consider the question of dissent in wartime. It is important for those who
wage war to know what citizens really think and also to have a sense of actual
and potential errors. But it is also important, especially in wartime, for citizens to
have a degree of solidarity and to believe that they are involved in a common
endeavor; this belief can help solve collective action problems that otherwise
threaten success. Some forms of dissent might correct mistakes while also
undermining social bonds. Of course freedom of speech should be the rule, but
See Harrington, supra note.
See id.
160 See id.
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there is no simple solution to this dilemma. We might simply notice that those
who are inclined to dissent must decide whether it is worthwhile to create the
disruption that comes from expressing their views.161
c. When silence is golden. I have been stressing cases in which disclosure
is in the group’s interest, but the immediately preceding discussion suggests the
opposite possibility.162 If group members reveal information that is embarrassing
or worse, they might assist a competitor or an adversary. They might also make
it harder for the group to have candid discussions in the future, simply because
everyone knows that whatever is said might be made public. Strong norms
against “leaking” are a natural corrective. And if some members of the group
have engaged in wrongdoing, revelation of that fact might injure many or all
group members. Anyone who has ever attended a faculty meeting is aware of the
possibility that speakers receive the full benefits of the time they use, while
inflicting costs on others; this unfortunate state of affairs can lead to unduly long
meetings. The same problem can inflict the deliberations of both legislatures and
courts. Conformity to a group norm, involving silence or informal time
constraints, can be extremely valuable.
It is important to acknowledge that the problem I am emphasizing—the
failure to disclose accurate information that will benefit the public—is closely
paralleled by the problems raised in many cases in which silence, not revelation,
is a collective good.163 And if disclosure will spread inaccurate information, it is

It is also possible that dissenters will be wrong, especially but not only if they are contrarians -and if they are wrong, they might spread errors through the same processes discussed here.
Nothing in the discussion thus far shows that conformity and cascades are bad as such. The only
suggestions have been that the underlying mechanisms increase the likelihood that people will
not reveal what they know or believe, and that this failure to disclose can produce social harm. It
would not be difficult to generate experiments in which informational and reputational
influences produce fewer mistakes than independence – if, for example, the task is especially
difficult, and if the experimenter introduces confident confederates equipped with the correct
answer. When specialists have authority, and when people listen carefully to them, it is generally
because errors are minimized through this route. But reputational influences carry serious risks
insofar as they lead people, including specialists, not to disclose what they actually know.
Indeed, this is the most troublesome implication of the conformity experiment.
162 See Edward Parson, Richard Zeckhauser, and Cary Coglianese, Collective Silence and
Individual Voice: The Logic of Information Games, forthcoming in Collective Choice: Essays in
Honor of Mancur Olson (J. Heckelman and D. Coates eds. 2003).
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unlikely to be beneficial,164 especially if it negates the beneficial effects of
previous decisions or produces a cascade of its own. Because my focus is on the
failure to disclose information, I will not devote attention to situations in which
silence is golden, except to note that the basic analysis of those situations is not
so different from the analysis here.165
d. Variations and the real world. The conformity experiment could itself
be varied in many ways, with predictable results. If financial rewards were solely
or almost solely for conformity, cascade behavior would be increased; if the
seventy-five cent reward were cut in half, cascade behavior should decline. Of
course it is possible to imagine many mixed systems. An obvious example is a
system of majority rule in which people are also rewarded for conformity or
punished for nonconformity. Will cascades develop in such cases? The answer
will depend on the size of the various incentives. If the accuracy of the group’s
decision will greatly affect individual well-being—if their lives depend on good
results—cascades are less likely. But if the ultimate outcome has little effect, and
if conformity will carry high rewards, cascades are inevitable. A system in which
individuals receive $2 for a correct majority decision, and $.25 for conforming,
will produce different (and better) results from a system in which individuals
receive $.25 for a correct majority decision, and $2 for conformity.
The real world of groups and democracy offers countless variations on
these rewards, and often the rewards are highly indeterminate; people do not
know what they are or have a hard time in quantifying them. But there can be
little doubt that conformity pressures actually result in less disclosure of
information. Consider the suggestion of a medical researcher who questions a
number of Lyme disease diagnoses: “Doctors can’t say what they think anymore.
. . . If you quote me as saying these things, I’m as good as dead.”166 When
privately interviewed, gang members express considerable discomfort about
their antisocial behavior, but their own conduct suggests a full commitment,
leading to a widespread belief that most people approve of what is being done.167
Or consider the remarks of a sociologist who has publicly raised questions about
the health threats posed by mad-cow disease, suggesting that if you raise those

This statement is qualified because inaccurate disclosures might, in fortunate circumstances, be
corrected, leading to a greater appreciation of what is true. See Mill, supra, for a classic discussion
of the possibly valuable role of falsehoods.
165 See Parson et al., supra, for helpful discussion.
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doubts publicly, “You get made to feel like a pedophile.”168 Tocqueville
explained the decline of the French church, in the mid-eighteenth century, in
these terms: “Those who retained their beliefs in the doctrines of the Church . . .
dreading isolation more than error, professed to share the sentiments of the
majority. So what was in reality the opinion of only a part . . . of the nation came
to be regarded as the will of all and for this reason seemed irresistible, even to
those who had given it this false appearance.”169 Or consider, as a chilling
example, the suggestion from a killer of Mostar, during the Bosniar war, that his
actions were not a product of his convictions about the evil character of those he
was killing. On the contrary, many of them were his former friends. His
explanation was that he had to do what he did to remain a part of his Serbian
community.170
There is a final wrinkle. In the settings discussed thus far, dissenters
proceed at their peril and nonconformity is punished. This will be my emphasis
throughout. But in some contexts, dissenters might be attempting to improve
their own prospects, and dissenting might be a sensible way of doing that. A
political dissenter, challenging some widespread practice, sometimes becomes
more prominent and more successful as a result. A judge who dissents in a highprofile case might not greatly fear that her reputation will be harmed; on the
contrary, she might think that the dissent will redound to her benefit. The point
is strengthened once we consider the fact that a society consists of countless
communities with a wide range of values and beliefs. A public dissenter might
impair his reputation in one group but simultaneously strengthen it in another.
Of course, some people say and do exactly what they think and do not greatly
care about their reputations; for them, informational influences are far more
important. The only suggestions are that much of the time, people do not want to
lose the good opinion of relevant others, and that the result of this desire is to
reduce the information that the public is able to have.
e. Beyond information. Often people lack much information, strictly
speaking, but they do have preferences and values. They might believe that the
words “under God” should not be included in the pledge of allegiance. They
might want to discontinue affirmative action. But in either case they might not
reveal what they want, simply because of the pressure to conform. I have
Andrew Higgins, It's a Mad, Mad, Mad-Cow World, Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 2001, at A13 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
169 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution 155 (1955).
170 See Russell Hardin, The Crippled Epistemology of Extremism, in Political Rationality and
Extremism 3, 16 (Albert Breton et al. eds. 2002).
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suggested that from the standpoint of democratic practice, this is a problem as
well. Most of the time, it is valuable for people to disclose what they want and
what they value. The basic findings as in the urn experiments would
undoubtedly be the same for preferences and values as well as facts, with
rewards for conformity greatly increasing the apparent (not real) degree of
agreement.
This point helps explain why “[u]npopular or dysfunctional norms may
survive even in the presence of a huge, silent majority of dissenters.”171 Fearing
the wrath of others, people might not publicly contest practices and values that
they privately abhor. The practice of sexual harassment long predated the idea of
sexual harassment, and the innumerable women who were subject to harassment
did not like it.172 But much of the time they were silent, largely because they
feared the consequences of public complaint. It is interesting to speculate about
the possibility that many current practices fall in the same general category:
those that produce harm, and are known to produce harm, but that persist
because most of those who are harmed believe that they will suffer if they object
in public.
C. Reputational Cascades
If conformity pressures are taken seriously, we can see the possibility of
reputational cascades, parallel to their informational sibling.173 In a reputational
cascade, people think that they know what is right, or what is likely to be right,
but they nonetheless go along with the crowd. Even the most confident people
sometimes fall prey to this process, silencing themselves in the process. In fact
the conformity-rewarding version of the urn experiment is an elegant example of
a reputational cascade. It is thus possible to exploit the influence of peer
pressure, found in the conformity experiments, to show how many social
movements become possible.
1. Mechanics. Suppose that Albert suggests that global warming is a
serious problem, and that Barbara concurs with Albert, not because she actually
agrees with Albert, but because she does not wish to seem, to Albert, to be
ignorant or indifferent to human suffering and environmental protection. If
Albert and Barbara agree that global warming is a serious problem, Cynthia
Bicchieri and Fukui, supra note, at 114.
See Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (1987).
173 See Timur Kuran, Public Lies and Private Truths (1997).
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might not contradict them publicly, and might even seem to share their
judgment, not because she believes the judgment to be correct, but because she
does not want to face the hostility or lose the good opinion of others. It is easy to
see how this process might generate a cascade. Once Albert, Barbara, and
Cynthia offer a united front on the issue, their friend David might be most
reluctant to contradict them even if he thinks that they are wrong. In the actual
world of group decisions, people are of course uncertain whether publicly
expressed statements are a product of independent knowledge, participation in
an informational cascade, or reputational pressure. It is reasonable to think that
much of the time, listeners and observers overstate the extent to which the
actions of others are based on independent information.
Reputational cascades occur within all branches of government. Of course
legislators are vulnerable to reputational pressures; that is part of their job. When
elected representatives suddenly support legislation to deal with an apparent
(sometimes not real) crisis, they are involved in a reputational cascade.174
Consider, for example, the rush, in July 2002, to enact measures to deal with
corporate corruption.175 Undoubtedly many legislators had private qualms about
the very legislation that they supported, and some of them probably
disapproved of measures for which they nonetheless voted. So too with the
unanimous (!) disapproval, by members of the United States Senate, of the court
of appeals decision to strike down the use of the words “under God” in the
pledge of allegiance. 176 In both cases, some legislators were involved in a
reputational cascade, repressing their private doubts in order to avoid injury to
their
reputations.
2. Pluralistic ignorance and self-censorship. I have emphasized that in an
informational cascade, the most serious problem is that the group fails to receive
privately held information. Exactly the same problem arises in a reputational
cascade, where the public, for a very different reason, is unable to learn what
many people know and think. Here people silence themselves not because they
believe that they are wrong but because they do not want to face the disapproval
that, they think, would follow from expressing the view that they believe to be
correct. The underlying problem here is pluralistic ignorance: ignorance, on the
See Kuran and Sunstein, supra note.
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part of most or all, of what most people actually think.177 In the face of pluralistic
ignorance, people can assume, wrongly, that others have a certain view, and they
alter their statements and actions accordingly.
Under certain conditions, this self-censorship is an extremely serious
social loss. For example, Communism was able to sustain itself in Eastern
Europe, not only because of force, but because people believed, wrongly, that
most people supported the existing regime.178 The fall of Communism was made
possible only by the disclosure of privately held views, which turned pluralistic
ignorance into something closer to pluralistic knowledge.179 As we shall see, selfcensoring can undermine success during war.180 Reputational pressures also help
fuel ethnic identifications, sometimes producing high levels of hostility among
groups for which, merely a generation before, such identifications were
unimportant and hostility was barely imaginable.181 And if certain views are
punished, it is possible that unpopular views will eventually be lost to public
debate, so that what was once “unthinkable” is now “unthought.”182 Views that
were originally taboo, and offered rarely or not at all, become excised entirely,
simply because they have not been heard. Here too those who do not care about
their reputation, and who say what they really think, perform a valuable public
service, often at their own expense.183
Various civil liberties, including freedom of speech, can be seen as an
effort to insulate people from the pressure to conform, and the reason is not only
to protect private rights, but also to protect the public against the risk of selfsilencing. A striking claim by Joseph Raz clarifies the point: “If I were to choose
between living in a society which enjoys freedom of expression, but not having
the right myself, or enjoying the right in a society which does not have it, I would
have no hesitation in judging that my own personal interest is better served by
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the first option.”184 The claim makes sense in light of the fact that a system of free
speech confers countless benefits on people who do not much care about
exercising that right. Consider the fact that in the history of the world, no society
with democratic elections and free speech has ever experienced a famine185—a
demonstration of the extent in which political liberty protects people who do not
exercise it. Freedom of association is especially noteworthy here, because it
allows people to band together in groups in which the ordinary incentive to
conform might be absent or even reversed. Society in general might punish
certain political views, but associations can be found in which those views are
tolerated or even encouraged. The secret ballot can be seen in related terms.186
One advantage of the secret ballot is that it reduces informational pressures,
leading the voter to express his own preference and to be less influenced by the
views of others. (Recall the majority-rewarding version of the urn experiment.)
But the more obvious advantage is that the voter can act anonymously and thus
cast his ballot without fear of opprobrium.
Just as informational cascades may be limited in their reach, there can be
local reputational cascades—ones that reshape the public pronouncements of
particular subgroups without affecting those of the broader society. When certain
subgroups believe that nonexistent risks are actually quite serious, or that some
hopeless medical treatment produces miracle cures, reputational cascades might
well be involved, simply because skeptics do not speak out. Of course
informational influences interact with reputational ones. South Africa, for
example, has experienced the literally deadly phenomenon of “AIDS denial,”
with prominent leaders suggesting that AIDS is not a real disease, but instead a
conspiracy to sell certain drugs to poor people. In that case, a cascade did
develop, but it was based mostly on transmission of alleged facts, not on fear of
reputational harm.187 But if we emphasize reputational pressures, we can identity
an important reason for unusual beliefs—about facts and values—among various
communities of like-minded people. It is often tempting to attribute such
differences to deep historical or cultural factors, but the real source, much of the
time, is reputational pressure.
Of course political leaders often play an important role in building those
pressures.188 If leaders insist that something is true, or that the nation should
Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain 39 (1994).
See Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines (1983).
186 See Kuran, supra note.
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pursue a certain course of action, some citizens might well be reluctant to
dissent, if only because of a fear of public disapproval. Here as elsewhere, the
result can be a serious social loss. And here again a strong system of civil
liberties, and an insistence on making safe space for enclaves of dissenters, can be
justified not as an effort to protect individual rights, but as a safeguard against
social blunders. A market system aggregates and spreads information better than
any planner could possibly do.189 In the same way, a system of free expression
and dissent protects against the false confidence and the inevitable mistakes of
planners, both private and public.
It would make little sense to say that cascades, in general, are good or bad.
Sometimes cascade effects will overcome group or public torpor, by generating
concern about serious though previously ignored problems. Sometimes cascade
effects will make people far more worried than they would otherwise be and
produce large-scale distortions in private judgments, public policy, and law. It is
reasonable to speculate that the antislavery movement had distinctive cascadelike features, as did the environmental movement in the United States, the fall of
Communism,190 and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa; so too with
Mao’s Cultural Revolution and the rise of Nazism in Germany. Typically
cascades are quite fragile, precisely because people’s commitments are based on
little private information. What I have emphasized here is the serious risk that
social cascades can lead to widespread errors, factual or otherwise.
D. Boundedly Rational Cascades
Thus far the discussion has assumed that people are largely rational—that
they take account, rationally, of the information provided by the statements and
actions of others, and that they care, sensibly enough, about their reputation. The
principal exception, suggested above, is that people may mistake a cascade for a
large number of independent decisions. But it is well-known that human beings
are “boundedly rational.” In most domains, people use heuristics, or mental
short-cuts, and they also show identifiable biases.191 Indeed, following others can
itself be seen as a heuristic, one that usually works well, but that also misfires in
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some cases.192 And for other heuristics and for every bias, there is a
corresponding possibility of a cascade.
Consider, for example, the availability heuristic, which has probably
become the most well-known in law.193 When people use the availability
heuristic, they answer a hard question about probability by asking whether
examples come readily to mind.194 How likely is a flood, an earthquake, an
airplane crash, a traffic jam, a terrorist attack, or a disaster at a nuclear power
plant? Lacking statistical knowledge, people try to think of illustrations.195 For
people without statistical knowledge—which is to say most people—it is hardly
irrational to use the availability heuristic. The problem is that this heuristic can
lead to serious errors of fact, in the form of excessive fear of small risks and
neglect of large ones.196 And indeed both surveys and actual behavior show
extensive use of the availability heuristic. Whether people will buy insurance for
natural disasters is greatly affected by recent experiences.197 If floods have not
occurred in the immediate past, people who live on flood plains are far less likely
to purchase insurance.198 In the aftermath of an earthquake, insurance for
earthquakes rises sharply—but it declines steadily from that point, as vivid
memories recede.199
For present purposes, the key point is that the availability heuristic does
not operate in a social vacuum. Whether an incident is “available” is a function
of social interactions. These interactions rapidly spread salient illustrations
within relevant communities, making those illustrations available to many or
most. Should swimmers worry about shark attacks?200 Are young girls likely to
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be abducted?201 In both cases, the United States has recently seen “availability
cascades,”202 in which salient examples were rapidly spread from one person to
the next. Note that this process typically involves information. If some people
use a recent assault to show that there is a serious risk of crime ten blocks north,
or a recent airplane accident to show that it is unsafe to fly, their statements carry
a certain authority, leading others to believe that they are true. And in the case of
shark attacks and abduction of young girls, the media spread a few gripping
examples, apparently providing information that was rapidly transmitted to
millions of people. But reputational forces play a role as well. Much of the time,
people are reluctant to say that an example is misleading and hence that others’
fears are groundless. Efforts at correction may suggest stupidity or callousness,
and a desire to avoid public opprobrium may produce a form of silencing.
Availability cascades are ubiquitous. Vivid examples, alongside social
interactions, help account for decisions to purchase insurance against natural
disasters.203 Cascade effects explain the existence of widespread public concern
about abandoned hazardous waste dumps (a relatively trivial environmental
hazard).204 In more recent years, availability cascades spurred public fears not
only of shark attacks and abductions of girls, but also of the pesticide Alar, of
plane crashes, and of shootings in schools in the aftermath of the murders in
Littleton, Colorado.205 Such effects helped produce massive dislocations in beef
production in Europe in connection with “mad cow disease”206; they help also to
account for the outpouring of enthusiasm for regulation of accounting practices
in the aftermath of the 2001 scandal involving Enron and other corporations.207
My suggestion is not that in all or most of these cases, availability cascades led to
excessive or inappropriate reactions. On the contrary, such cascades sometimes
have the valuable effect of promoting public attention to serious but neglected
problems. The suggestion is only that the intensity of public reactions is best
understood by seeing the interaction between the availability heuristic and the
See
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cascade effects I have been emphasizing.208 The problem is that those interactions
make some errors inevitable, simply because a heuristic, even if generally
helpful, is bound to misfire in many cases. Here as elsewhere, dissent can be an
important corrective. For organizations and governments, the question is how to
make dissent less costly, or even to reward it, especially when dissenters benefit
not themselves, but others.
IV. Group Polarization
Thus far I have been exploring how informational and reputational
influences produce conformity and cascades. I have also identified factors that
can increase or reduce the likelihood of both of these. When people are not
bound by affective ties, the magnitude of both influences diminishes. When
people define themselves as opposed to the relevant others, the direction of the
influence might even shift. Greater information of course reduces the effects, and
when people know that certain people are more informed, cascades are
shattered. With these points in view, let us now turn to the phenomenon of
group polarization, a phenomenon that contains large lessons about the behavior
of interest groups, religious organizations, political parties, juries, legislatures,
judicial panels, and even nations.209

There is an interesting puzzle for those interested in the real-world uses of availability
heuristic: In many contexts, multiple images are literally “available.” Consider the problem of
gun violence. It is not hard to find cases in which the presence of guns led to many deaths, and
also cases in which the presence of guns allowed law-abiding citizens to protect themselves
against criminals. See Donald Braman and Dan M. Kahan, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A
Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions (unpublished manuscript 2002). In the face of
conflicting instances, which cases are especially available, and to whom? The same question can
be raised in the environmental setting. We can find cases in which serious harm resulted from a
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expended a great deal to reduce risks that turned out, on reflection, to be small or illusory. The
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are a product of availability, to be sure; but what is available is also a product of beliefs and
orientations. In other words, availability may be endogenous to individual predispositions.
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A. The Basic Phenomenon
What happens within deliberating bodies? Do groups compromise? Do
they move toward the middle of the tendencies of their individual members? The
answer is now clear, and it is perhaps not what intuition would suggest:
Members of a deliberating group end up in a more extreme position in line with
their tendencies before deliberation began.210 This is the phenomenon known as
group polarization. Group polarization is the typical pattern with deliberating
groups, having been found in hundreds of studies involving over a dozen
countries, including the United States, France, and Germany.211
It follows that a group of people who think that global warming is a
serious problem will, after discussion, think that global warming is a very
serious problem; that those who approve of an ongoing war effort will, as a
result of discussion, become still more enthusiastic about that effort; that people
who dislike the Rehnquist Court will dislike it quite intensely after talking with
one another; that people who disapprove of the United States, and are suspicious
of its intentions, will increase their disapproval and suspicion if they exchange
points of view. Indeed, there is specific evidence of the latter phenomenon
among citizens of France.212 When like-minded people talk with one another,
they usually end up thinking a more extreme version of what they thought
before they started to talk. It should be readily apparent that enclaves of people,
inclined to rebellion or even violence, might move sharply in that direction as a
See Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition 203-226 (1985). At first glance, group
polarization might be seen to be in tension with the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which holds that
when people are answering a common question with two answers, one false and one true, and
when the average probability that each voter will answer correctly exceeds 50%, the probability
of a correct answers, by a majority of the group, increases to certainty as the size of the group
increases. For a good overview, see Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet
Jury Theorem, 31 J Legal Stud. 327, 329-334 (2002). The importance of the theorem lies in the
demonstration that groups are likely to do better than individuals, and large groups better than
small ones, if majority rule is used and if each person is more likely than not to be correct. But
when group polarization is involved, individuals do not make judgments on their own; they are
influenced by the judgments of others. When interdependent judgments are being made, and
when some people are wrong, it is not at all clear that groups will do better than individuals. For
empirical evidence, see Norbert Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and
Groups, 103 Psych. Rev. 687 (1996). On some of the theoretical issues, see David Austen-Smith,
and J.S. Banks, Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 90
American Political Science Review 34 (1996).
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consequence of internal deliberations. Political extremism is often a product of
group polarization.213
There is a close relationship between group polarization and cascade
effects. Both of these are a product of informational and reputational influences.
A key difference is that group polarization refers to the effects of deliberation,214
and cascades typically do not involve discussion at all. In addition, group
polarization does not necessarily involve a cascade-like process. Polarization can
result simply from simultaneous independent decisions, by all or most
individuals, to move toward a more extreme point in line with the tendencies of
group members.
To see the operation of group polarization in a legal context, let us explore
in more detail the study of punitive intentions and punitive damage awards,
referred to above.215 The study involved about 3000 jury-eligible citizens; its
major purpose was to determine how individuals would be influenced by seeing
and discussing the punitive intentions of others. Hence subjects were asked to
record, in advance of deliberation, a “punishment judgment” on a scale of 0 to 8,
where 0 indicated that the defendant should not be punished at all, and 8
indicated that the defendant should be punished extremely severely. After the
individual judgments were recorded, jurors were sorted into six-person groups
and asked to deliberate to a unanimous “punishment verdict.” It would be
reasonable to predict that the verdicts of juries would be the median of
punishment judgments of jurors; but the prediction would be badly wrong.
Instead the effect of deliberation was to create both a severity shift for
high-punishment jurors and a leniency shift for low-punishment jurors.216 When
the median judgment of individual jurors was four or more on the eight-point
scale, the jury’s verdict was above that median judgment.217 Consider, for
example, a case involving a man who nearly drowned on a defectively
constructed yacht. Jurors tended to be outraged by the idea of a defectively built
yacht, and groups were significantly more outraged than their median

See Albert Breton and Silvana Dalmazzone, Information Control, Loss of Autonomy, and the
Emergence of Political Extremism 53-55 (Albert Bretton et al. eds. 2002).
214 Group polarization can occur, however, as a result of mere exposure to the views of others. See
Robert Baron et al., supra note, at 74.
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members.218 But when the median judgment of individual jurors was below four,
the jury’s verdict was typically below that median judgment.219 Consider a case
involving a shopper who was injured in a fall when an escalator suddenly
stopped.220 Individual jurors were not greatly bothered by the incident, seeing it
as a genuine accident rather than a case of serious wrongdoing; and jurors were
more lenient than individual jurors.221 Here, then, is a clear example of group
polarization in action. Groups whose members were antecedently inclined to
impose large punishments become inclined toward larger punishments. The
opposite effect was found with groups whose members were inclined toward
small punishments.
B. Outrage
When we consider the ingredients of punishment judgments, this finding
has a large implication for people’s behavior both inside and outside the
courtroom. Punishment judgments are rooted in outrage,222 and a group’s
outrage, on a bounded scale, is an excellent predictor of the same group’s
punishment judgments, on the same scale.223 Apparently people who begin with
a high level of outrage become still more outraged as a result of group
discussion. Moreover, the degree of the shift depends on the antecedent level of
outrage; the higher the original level, the greater the shift as a result of internal
deliberations.224 There is a point here about the well-springs of not only of severe
punishment by jurors, mobs, and governments, but also of rebellion and
violence.225 If like-minded people, predisposed to be outraged, are put together
with one another, significant changes are to be expected.
It should be easy to see that group polarization is inevitably at work in
feuds, ethnic and international strife, and war. One of the characteristic features
Id. at 1151, 1152.
Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide 32-33 (2002).
223 Id. at 36.
224 See Schkade et al., supra, at 1152, showing that in the top five outrage cases, the mean shift was
11%, higher than in any other class of cases. The effect is more dramatic still for dollars, see id.,
where high dollar awards shifted upwards by a significant margin This finding is closely
connected to another one: Extremists are most likely to shift, and likely to shift most, as a result of
discussions with one another. See John Turner et al., Rediscovering the Social Group 154-59
(1987).
225 See Hardin, supra note; Breton, supra note, at 53-55.
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of feuds is that members of feuding groups tend to talk only to one another,
fueling and amplifying their outrage, and solidifying their impression of the
relevant events. Group polarization occurs every day within Israel and among
the Palestinian Authority. Many social movements, both good and bad, become
possible through the heightened effects of outrage226; consider the movement for
rights for deaf people, which was greatly enhanced by the fact that the deaf have
a degree of geographical isolation.227
C. Hidden Profiles and Self-Silencing in Groups
The tendency toward extreme movement is the most noteworthy finding
in the literature on group polarization.228 But there is a neglected point, of special
importance for my argument here: In a deliberating group, those with a minority
position often silence themselves or otherwise have disproportionately little
weight. The result can be “hidden profiles”—important information that is not
shared within the group.229 Group members often have information but do not
discuss it, and the result is to produce inferior decisions.
Consider a study of serious errors within working groups, both face-toface and online.230 The purpose of the study was to see how groups might
collaborate to make personnel decisions. Resumes for three candidates, applying
for a marketing manager position, were placed before the groups. The attributes
of the candidates were rigged by the experimenters so that one applicant was
clearly the best for the job described. Packets of information were given to
subjects, each containing a subset of information from the resumes, so that each
group member had only part of the relevant information. The groups consisted
of three people, some operating face-to-face, some operating on-line. Two results
were especially striking. First, group polarization was common, as groups ended
up in a more extreme position in accordance with the original thinking of their
members. Second, almost none of the deliberating groups made what was
conspicuously the right choice, because they failed to share information in a way
See Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Cass R. Sunstein, Inequality and Indignation, Phil & Pub.
Affairs (forthcoming 2002).
227 See Sharon Groch, Free Spaces: Creating Oppositional Spaces in the Disability Rights
Movement, in Oppositional Consciousness 65, 67-72 (Jane Mansbridge and Aldon Morris eds.
2001).
228 See id.
229 See Robert Baron et al., Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action 77 (2d ed. 1999).
230 See R. Hightower and L. Sayeed, The Impact of Computer-Mediated Communication Systems
on Biased Group Discussion, 11 Computers in Human Behavior 33 (1995).
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that would permit the group to make an objective decision. Members tended to
share positive information about the winning candidate and negative
information about the losers, while also suppressing negative information about
the winner and positive information about the losers. Their statements served to
“reinforce the march toward group consensus rather than add complications and
fuel debate.”231
This finding is in line with the more general suggestion that groups tend
to dwell on shared information and to neglect information that is held by few
members. It should be unnecessary to emphasize that this tendency can lead to
large errors.232 To understand this particular point, it is necessary to explore the
mechanisms that produce group polarization.
D. Why Polarization? Some Explanations
Why do like-minded people go to extremes? There are several reasons.233
1. Information. The most important, involving informational influences, is
similar to what we have found in connection with conformity and cascades. The
simple idea here is that people respond to the arguments made by other
people—and the “argument pool,” in any group with some initial disposition in
one direction, will inevitably be skewed toward that disposition.234 A group
whose members tend to think that Israel is the real aggressor in the Mideast
conflict will tend to hear many arguments to that effect, and relatively few
opposing views. It is inevitable that the group’s members will have heard some,
but not all, of the arguments that emerge from the discussion. Having heard all
of what is said, there is likely to be further movement in the anti-Israel direction.
So too with a group whose members tend to oppose affirmative action: Group
members will hear a large number of arguments against affirmative action and a
fewer number of arguments on its behalf. If people are listening, they will have a
stronger conviction, in the same direction from which they began, as a result of
deliberation. An emphasis on limited argument pools also helps to explain the
problem of “hidden profiles” and the greater discussion of shared information
during group discussion. It is simply a statistical fact that when more people
have a piece of information, there is a greater probability that it will be

Wallace, supra note, at 82.
See Baron et al., supra note, at 77.
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mentioned.235 Hidden profiles are a predictable result, to the detriment of the
ultimate decision.
2. Confidence and corroboration. The second explanation begins by noting
that people with extreme views tend to have more confidence that they are right,
and that as people gain confidence, they become more extreme in their beliefs. 236
The intuition here is simple: People who lack confidence, and who are unsure
what they should think, tend to moderate their views. It is for this reason that
cautious people, not knowing what to do, are likely to choose the midpoint
between relevant extremes.237 But if other people seem to share your view, you
are likely to become more confident that you are correct—and hence to move in a
more extreme direction. In a wide variety of experimental contexts, people’s
opinions have been shown to become more extreme simply because their view
has been corroborated, and because they have been more confident after learning
of the shared views of others.238 Note that there is an obvious connection between
this explanation and the finding, mentioned above, that a panel of three judges of
the same party is likely to behave quite differently from a panel with only two
such judges. The existence of unanimous confirmation, from two others, will
strengthen confidence and hence strengthen extremity.239
3. Social comparison. A third explanation, involving social comparison,
begins with the claim that people want to be perceived favorably by other group
members, and also to perceive themselves favorably.240 Their views may, to a
greater or lesser extent, be a function of how they want to present themselves.
Once people hear what others believe, they adjust their positions in the direction
of the dominant position, to hold onto their preserved self-presentation. They
may want to signal, for example, that they are not cowardly or cautious,
especially in an entrepreneurial group that disparages these characteristics, and
hence they will frame their position so that they do not appear as such by
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comparison to other group members.241 And when they hear what other people
think, they might find that they occupy a somewhat different position, in relation
to the group, from what they hoped; and they shift accordingly.242
For example, if people believe that they are somewhat more opposed to
capital punishment than most people, they might shift a bit after finding
themselves in a group of people who are strongly opposed to capital
punishment, to maintain their preferred self-presentation. The phenomenon
appears to occur in many contexts.243 People may wish, for example, not to seem
too enthusiastic, or too restrained in their enthusiasm for, affirmative action,
feminism, or an increase in national defense; hence their views may shift when
they see what other group members think. The result is to press the group’s
position toward one or another extreme, and also to induce shifts in individual
members. There is a great deal of support for this account of group
polarization.244
Note that an emphasis on social comparison gives a new and perhaps
better explanation for the existence of hidden profiles and the failure to share
certain information within a group. People might emphasize shared views and
information, and downplay unusual perspectives and new evidence, simply
from a fear of group rejection and a desire for general approval.245 In political and
legal institutions, there is an unfortunate implication: Group members who care
about one another’s approval, or who depend upon one another for material or
nonmaterial benefits, might well suppress highly relevant information. Hence
this account of group polarization is connected with the idea of reputational
cascades, where blunders are highly probable.
E. Skewed Debates

Id. at 213-14.
Id. It has similarly been suggested that majorities are especially potent because people do not
want to incur the wrath, or lose the favor, of large numbers of people, and that when minorities
have influence, it is because they produce genuine attitudinal change. See Baron et al., supra note,
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In the context of punitive damage awards by juries, a particular finding
deserves emphasis.246 Thus far my discussion of the relevant study has stressed
how deliberation affected punitive intentions, measured on a bounded numerical
scale. But jurors were also asked to record their dollar judgments, in advance of
deliberation, and then to deliberate to dollar verdicts. Did high awards go up
and low awards go down, as the idea of group polarization might predict? Not
quite. The principal effect was make all awards go up, in the sense that the jury’s
dollar award typically exceeded the median award of individual jurors.247
Indeed, the effect was so pronounced that in 27% of cases, the jury’s verdict was
as high as, or higher than, the highest predeliberation judgment of jurors!248
There is a further point. The effect of deliberation, in increasing dollar awards,
was most pronounced in the case of high awards. For example, the median
individual judgment, in the case involving the defective yacht, was $450,000,
whereas the median jury judgment, in that same case, was $1,000,000.249 But
awards shifted upwards for low awards as well.250
Why did this happen? A possible explanation, consistent with group
polarization, is that any positive median award suggests a predeliberation
tendency to punish, and deliberation aggravates that tendency by increasing
awards. But even if it is right, this explanation seems insufficiently specific. The
striking fact is that those arguing for higher awards seem to have an automatic
rhetorical advantage over those arguing for lower awards. A subsequent study of
law students supports this finding, suggesting that given existing social norms,
people find it easy, in the abstract, to defend higher punitive awards against
corporations, and harder to defend lower awards.251 Findings of rhetorical
advantage have been made in seemingly distant areas. Suppose that doctors are
deciding what steps to take to resuscitate patients. Are individuals less likely to
support heroic efforts than groups? Evidence suggests that as individuals,
doctors are less likely to do so than groups, apparently because those who favor
such efforts have a rhetorical advantage over those who do not.252
Or consider the difference between individual behavior and team
behavior in the Dictator Game, used by social scientists to study selfishness and
See note supra.
See Schkade et al., supra note, at 1152, 1155-56.
248 Id. at 1140.
249 Schkade et al., supra note, at 1152.
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altruism.253 In this game, a subject is told that she can allocate a sum of money,
say $10, between herself and some stranger. The standard economic prediction is
that most subjects will keep all or almost all of the money for themselves; why
should we share money with strangers? But the standard prediction is wrong.
Most people choose to keep somewhere between $6 and $8 and to share the
rest.254 The question here, however, is how is individual behavior is affected once
people are placed in teams. The answer is that team members choose still more
equal divisions.255 This result seems best explained by reference to a rhetorical
advantage, disfavoring selfishness, even within a group that stands to benefit.256
Apparently people do not want to appear to be greedy. Of course this outcome,
and the effect of group influence, would change if the team in the Dictator Game
had some reason to be hostile to the beneficiaries of their generosity. We can
easily imagine a variation of the dictator game in which, for example, people of a
relatively poor religious group were deciding how much to allocate to another
religious group that was thought to be both hostile and far wealthier. In this
variation, the rhetorical advantage might favor greater selfishness.
But what produces a rhetorical advantage? The simplest answer points to
prevailing social norms, which of course vary across time and place. Among
most Americans, current norms make it easier to argue, other things equal, for
higher penalties against corporations for egregious misconduct, But it is possible
to imagine subcommunities (corporate headquarters?) in which the rhetorical
advantage runs the other way. In any case it is easy to envisage many other
contexts in which one or another side has an automatic rhetorical advantage.
Consider, as possible examples, debates over whether there should be higher
penalties for those convicted of drug offenses, or whether tax rates should be
reduced; in modern political debates, those favoring higher penalties and lower
taxes have the upper hand. Of course there are limits on the feasible level of
change. But when a rhetorical advantage is involved, group deliberation will
produce significant shifts in individual judgments. Undoubtedly legislative
behavior is affected by mechanisms of this sort, and it is likely that many
movements within judicial panels can be explained in similar terms.
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Are rhetorical advantages unhelpful or damaging? In the abstract, this is
an impossible question to answer, because shifts have to be evaluated on their
merits.257 Perhaps the higher punitive awards that follow deliberation are simply
better. So too, perhaps, for the movements by doctors, taking more heroic
measures, and by groups deciding how equally to spread funds. The only point
is that such advantages exist; and it would be most surprising if they were
always benign.
F. More Extremism, Less Extremism
Group polarization is not a social constant. It can be increased or
decreased, and even eliminated, by certain features of group members or their
situation.
1. Antecedent extremism. Extremists are especially prone to polarization.
It is more probable that they will shift and it is probable that they will shift more.
When they start out an extreme point and are placed in a group of like-minded
people, they are likely to go especially far in the direction with which they
started.258 There is a lesson here about the sources of terrorism and political
violence in general.259 And because there is a link between confidence and
extremism, the confidence of particular members also plays an important role;
confident people are more prone to polarization.260
2. Solidarity and affective ties. If members of the group think that they
have a shared identity, and a high degree of solidarity, there will be heightened
polarization.261 One reason is that if people feel united by some factor (for
example, politics or religious convictions), dissent will be dampened. If
individual members tend to perceive one another as friendly, likable, and similar
to them, the size and likelihood of the shift will increase.262 The existence of
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affective ties reduces the number of diverse arguments and also intensifies social
influences on choice.263 One implication, noted above, is that mistakes are likely
to be increased when group members are united mostly through bonds of
affection and not through concentration on a particular task; it is in the former
case that alternative views will less likely find expression.264 Hence people are
less likely to shift if the direction advocated is being pushed by unfriendly group
members.265 A sense of “group belongingness” affects the extent of
polarization.266 In the same vein, physical spacing tends to reduce polarization; a
sense of common fate and intragroup similarity tend to increase it, as does the
introduction of a rival “outgroup.”267
An interesting experiment attempted to investigate the effects of group
identification.268 Some subjects were given instructions in which group
membership was made salient (the “group immersion” condition), whereas
others were not (the “individual” condition). For example, subjects in the group
immersion condition were told that their group consisted solely of first-year
psychology students, and that they were being tested as group members rather
than as individuals. The relevant issues involved affirmative action, government
subsidies for the theatre, privatization of nationalized industries, and phasing
out nuclear power plants .The results were quite striking.269 Polarization
generally occurred. But there was the least polarization in the individual
condition; polarization was greater in the group immersion condition, when
group identity was emphasized. This experiment strongly suggests that
polarization is highly likely to occur, and to be most extreme, when group
membership is made salient.
3. Exit. Over time, group polarization can be fortified because of “exit,” as
members leave the group because they reject the direction in which things are
(1987), attempt to use this evidence as a basis for a new synthesis, one that they call “a selfcategorization theory of group polarization,” id. at 154.
263 See Brooke Harrington, The Pervasive Effects of Embeddedness in Organizations 24
(unpublished manuscript 2000).
264 See Harrington, supra note, at 220-26.
265 See Hans Brandstatter, Social Emotions in Discussion Groups, in Dynamics of Group Decisions
(Hans Brandstatter et al. ed. 1978). See, Turner et al., supra note, at 154-59, for the especially
interesting implication that a group of comparative extremists will show a comparatively greater
shift toward extremism. See id. at 158.
266 Id. at 151.
267 Id.
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heading.270 If exit is pervasive, the tendency to extremism will be greatly
aggravated. The group will end up smaller, but its members will be both more
like-minded and more willing to take extreme measures; and that very fact will
mean that internal discussions will produce more extremism still. If only loyalists
stay, the group’s median member will be more extreme, and deliberation will
produce increasingly extreme movements.
4. Informed members and facts. When one or more people in a group
know the right answer to a factual question, the group is likely to shift in the
direction of accuracy.271 If the question is how many people were on the earth in
1940, or the number of home runs hit by Hank Aaron, or the distance between
Chicago and New York, and if one or a few people know the right answer, the
group is likely not to polarize, but to converge on that answer. The reason is
simple: The person who knows the answer will speak with confidence and
authority, and is likely to be convincing for that very reason. Of course this is not
inevitable; Asch’s conformity experiments show that social pressures can lead to
errors even with respect to simple factual claims. But in many cases, group
members who are ignorant will be tentative, and members who are informed
will speak confidently. This is enough to ensure convergence on truth rather than
polarization. Here there is a link between what prevents polarization and what
shatters cascades: A person who knows, and is known to know, the truth.
In this light it becomes easier to understand the outcomes of experiments
that show a potential advantage of groups over individuals.272 One set of
experiments involved two analytic tasks. The first involved a statistical problem,
requiring subjects to guess the composition of an urn containing blue balls and
red balls. (This experiment involved team decision-making and was not a test for
cascade effects.) The other involved a problem in monetary policy, asking
participants to manipulate the interest rate to steer the economy. People were
asked to perform as individuals and in groups. The basic results for the two
experiments were similar. Groups significantly outperformed individuals (and
they did not, on balance, take longer to make decision). Perhaps most
surprisingly, there were no differences between group decisions made with a
unanimity requirement and group decisions made by majority rule. How can
these results be explained? The experimenters do not have a complete account.
See Hardin, supra note.
See James Fishkin and Robert Luskin, Bringing Deliberation to the Democratic Dialogue, in
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An obvious possibility is that each group contained one or more strong analysts,
who are able to move the group in the right direction. But a series of regressions,
comparing the performance of the best individual players offers only mixed
support for this hypothesis.273 It seems that in these experiments, group results
were driven by the best points and arguments, which would be spread among
the various individual players. Here we find a tribute to Aristotle’s suggestion
that groups can do much better than individuals.274
5. Equally opposed subgroups. Depolarization, rather than polarization,
will be found when the relevant group consists of individuals drawn equally
from two extremes.275 Thus if people who initially favor caution are put together
with people who initially favor risk-taking, the group judgment will move
toward the middle. Consider a study276 consisting of six-member groups
specifically designed to contain two subgroups (of three persons each) initially
committed to opposed extremes; the effect of discussion was to produce
movement toward the center. One reason may be the existence of partially
shared persuasive arguments in both directions.277 Interestingly, this study of
equally opposed subgroups found the greatest depolarization with obscure
matters of fact (e.g., the population of the United States in 1900)—and the least
depolarization with highly visible public questions (e.g., whether capital
punishment is justified). Matters of personal taste depolarized a moderate
amount (e.g., preference for basketball or football, or for colors for painting a
room).278 Hence “familiar and long-debated issues do not depolarize easily.”279
With respect to such issues, people are simply less likely to shift at all, in part
“because the total pool of arguments has long been familiar to all,”280 and
nothing new will emerge from discussion.
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Compare in this regard an experiment designed to see how group
polarization might be dampened.281 The experiment involved the creation of
four-person groups, which, on the basis of pretesting, were known to include
equal numbers of persons on two sides of political issues (whether smoking
should be banned in public places, whether sex discrimination is a thing of the
past, whether censorship of material for adults infringes on human liberties).
Judgments were registered on a scale running from +4 (strong agreement) to 0
(neutral) to –4 (strong disagreement). In half of the cases (the “uncategorized
condition”), subjects were not made aware that the group consisted of equally
divided subgroups in pretests. In the other half (the “categorized condition”),
subjects were told that they would find a sharp division in their group, which
consisted of equally divided subgroups. They were also informed who was in
which group and told that they should sit around the table so that one subgroup
was on one side facing the other group. In the uncategorized condition,
discussion generally led to a dramatic reduction in the mean gap between the
two sides, thus producing a convergence of opinion toward the middle of the
two opposing positions (a mean of 3.40 scale points, on the scale of +4 to –4). But
things were very different in the categorized condition. Here the shift toward the
median was much less pronounced, and frequently there was barely any shift at
all (a mean of 1.68 scale points). In short, calling attention to group membership
made people far less likely to shift in directions urged by people from different
groups.
**

**

**

**

**

**
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My discussion of group influences—of conformity, cascades, and
polarization—is now complete. I have emphasized many findings from social
science, but I have tried at the same time to give a sense of how those findings
bear on issues in law and politics. It should be clear that there is a long list of
potential applications, and any set of selections, from that list, is inevitably
arbitrary. In the discussion that follows, I emphasize four areas in which an
understanding of group influences helps to illuminate legal problems. The first
involves law’s expressive function—the circumstances in which a mere
statement, made by the law, is likely to affect people’s behavior. I draw a link
among legal pronouncements, Milgram’s experimenter, and Asch’s unanimous
confederates. The second involves the institutions of the American Constitution,
based on the founding enthusiasm for the expression of diverse and dissenting
Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What To Think By Knowing Who You Are, 29 British J Soc.
Psych. 97, 112 (1990)
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views. I suggest that the American Constitution creates a deliberative democracy
of a distinctive kind—a deliberative democracy that prizes heterogeneity. The
third area involves the value of dissent in a place not always thought to benefit
from it: the federal judiciary. Because judges are subject to conformity and
cascade effects as well as group polarization, it is exceedingly important to
promote ideological diversity within the federal courts. The fourth and final area
involves affirmative action in higher education. Here I offer an ambivalent
lesson, suggesting that racial diversity is, in some domains, unimportant for the
exchange of (relevant) ideas, but that it is important in other domains, usually
involved in both undergraduate and law school education.
V. The Expressive Function of Law
In recent years, there has been a great deal of discussion of law’s
expressive function—of the role of law in “making statements,” as opposed to
regulating conduct directly through actual punishments for violations.282 In this
Part, I make three suggestions. First, we can better understand the expressive
function of law if we see certain legal enactments as offering signals about what
it is right to do and about what other people think it is right to do. Second, a legal
expression is most likely to be effective if violations are highly visible; visibility
matters because people do not want to incur the wrath of others . Third, a legal
expression is most likely to be ineffective if violators are part of a deviant
subcommunity which rewards, or at least does not punish, noncompliance. In
such cases, behavior within the subcommunity can counteract the effects of law.
Each of these points can be closely connected with an understanding of
conformity, cascades, and group polarization. We can thus use that
understanding to see when government might bring about compliance without
relying on public enforcement—and also when enforcement is likely to be
indispensable.
A. Law As Signal
Sometimes law is infrequently enforced, but there is automatic or nearautomatic compliance.283 It is in this sense that law seems to have an expressive
function, making statements and having effects merely by virtue of those
statements. When effects occur, it is because the law offers signals on both the
See Adler, supra note.
See Robert Kagan and Jerome Skolnick, in Banning Smoking: Compliance Without
Enforcement, in Smoking Policy: Law, Politics, and Culture (Robert Radin ed. 1999).
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informational and reputational sides. If law is made by sensible people, and if
law bans certain conduct, there is a good reason to presume that the conduct
should be banned. And when law bans certain conduct, there is good reason to
presume that other people think that the conduct should be banned. In either
case, sensible people have fresh reason to do what the law asks them to do. Of
course the presumptions can be rebutted. Informed people might know that the
law is asking people to do something senseless, or not to do something sensible.
They might also know that most people, or most relevant people, actually reject
the law. But if these cases are the exception rather than the rule, we can have a
better understanding of why law will produce movement even if no one is
enforcing it.
Consider, for example, an empirical study of bans on smoking in public
places.284 The simplest lesson is that people comply with those bans even though
they are hardly ever enforced. The study finds that in three cities in California—
Berkeley, Richmond, and Oakland—there were very few complaints about
violations. In Berkeley, the responsible health department officials found it
unnecessary to issue even a single formal citation, and no cases were referred for
prosecution.285 In restaurants in Richmond, compliance was nearly 100%, with
workplace compliance hovering between 75%–85%.286 The level of compliance
was also extremely high in Oakland, with the exception of “certain restaurants in
the Asian community where nearly all the patrons are smokers.”287 High levels of
compliance were also found in workplaces, high schools, and fast-food
restaurants.288 Other studies, involving as Cambridge and Winnipeg, Manitoba,
similarly find that bans on public smoking are almost entirely self-enforcing.289
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This evidence suggests that a legal pronouncement can have the same
effect as Asch’s unanimous confederates. When a law bans smoking in public
places, the pronouncement carries information to the effect that it is wrong, all
things considered, to smoke in public places. Equally important, the law suggests
that most people believe that it is wrong to smoke in public places. And if most
people think that it is wrong to smoke in public places, would-be smokers are
less likely to smoke, in part because they do not want to be criticized or
reprimanded. It follows that when law is effective when unenforced, an
important reason is the possibility of private enforcement. If violations have a
high degree of visibility, and risk the wrath of private enforcers, compliance
might well become widespread. “In contrast to violations of laws against driving
and drinking, narcotics use, and tax evasion, infractions of no-smoking rules in
public places are relatively visible . . . to an almost omnipresent army of selfinterested, highly motivated private enforcement agents—nonsmokers who
resist exposure to tobacco smoke.”290 In some cases, the law might even be
equivalent to Milgram’s experimenter, with a significant degree of authority
even if no sanctions will be imposed. To the extent that the experimenter’s
authority comes from a perception of expertise, the law is closely analogous.
We might think of the underlying laws as exercises in norm
management—and extremely inexpensive ones at that. They are inexpensive in
the sense that taxpayer resources are unnecessary to produce compliance. And in
the best cases, expressive law might even start, shatter, or fuel a cascade. Once
compliance begins, and is widely seen as such (especially from “fashion
leaders”), there might well be compliance cascades, spurred by both
informational and reputational influences. In the context of sexual harassment
and smoking, law does seem to have caught a wave—and to have enlarged it
significantly.291 A key point here is that the law was ahead, but not too far ahead,
of the public at large. If the law were not ahead of the public, it would add
nothing, and in that sense have no effect at all. But if the law moved too far
ahead of the public, it could not be effective without aggressive enforcement
activity.292 And a law that is too far ahead of the public is unlikely, for that very
reason, to be aggressively enforced: Prosecutors and jurors are unlikely to punish
people when the public does not support punishment.293 Law is most effective
when it goes somewhat, but not too far, beyond people’s existing values.
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Thus far I have emphasized the situation from the point of view of the
would-be violator. But a law has effects on private enforcers as well. In the
absence of a legal ban, people who object to smoking in public places might well
be timid about complaining, even if they find cigarette smoke irritating or worse.
The same people are likely to be energized by a supportive enactment, which
suggests both that they are right and that their beliefs are generally shared. With
law on their side, they are less likely to appear to be noisy intermeddlers
invoking a parochial norm. Someone who complains about speeding, or drunk
driving, or smoking in public is far more likely to feel, or to be perceived as,
having a legitimate complaint if the law requires the behavior they seek. Now of
course this is not all of the picture. Among some people, the law has a high
degree of moral authority, greatly exceeding the shared but unenacted view of
many people.294 If this is the case, the law’s authority will extend well beyond
that of Asch’s unanimous confederates, and probably beyond that of Milgram’s
experimenter as well. But we cannot fully appreciate law’s moral authority
without seeing it as intertwined with the informational and reputational factors
that I have been emphasizing.
B. The Preconditions of Norm Management
When will norm management work without significant enforcement
activity? When will it fail? Begin with the case of a rational person who is
considering whether to comply with the law. Among the relevant considerations
are a) the likelihood of enforcement, b) the magnitude of the punishment in the
event of enforcement, c) the reputational costs of violation, d) the reputational
benefits of violation, e) the intrinsic benefits of compliance (perhaps a refusal to
smoke will have health benefits), and f) the intrinsic costs of compliance (perhaps
it is extremely pleasant to smoke, and extremely unpleasant not to smoke). By
varying any of these variables, government might be able to achieve greater
compliance. For present purposes, my emphasis is on c) and d).
To know whether a legal pronouncement will be effective, a key point
involves the nature and extent of private enforcement. Recall that in the Asch
experiments, the level of error is significantly decreased when people’s answers
are given anonymously, and also when people are given a financial incentive to
answer correctly. These findings suggest that seemingly modest changes in social
Law might well lack moral authority too, in which case the informational and reputational
signals will be diminished. See Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Cass R. Sunstein, Inequality and
Indignation, Phil & Pub Aff (forthcoming 2002). I discuss this point below.
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context can counteract the pressure to conform. Consider in this light the close
empirical association between visibility and compliance without enforcement.
Parking in places reserved for the handicapped, and smoking in public, are easy
to see and in both cases private enforcement is likely.295 By contrast, tax
violations and sex offenses tend to be invisible, and hence violators need not
worry so much, at the time of violation, about the risk of public opprobrium.
At the same time, law’s expressive function can be reduced or even
counteracted if there is private support for violations. “People will defy
dominant norms or laws, despite considerable risks of punishment, when they
enjoy the social support of a ‘deviant subculture’ that continues to endorse the
validity of condemned behavior.”296 In such cases, prospective violators are
roughly in the position of peer-supported subjects in the Milgram experiment—
at least if they have strong reason, based on principle or self-interest, not to
comply. And if the law is perceived as senseless, private support for violations
can operate in the same way as a voice of reason in the Asch experiments. Hence
it is possible to find “deviant subcultures” in which violations of law are
effectively rewarded, through admiration and even a general increase in statute.
It is also possible to find subcultures in which those who comply with the law
can be heavily “taxed,” through ridicule, ostracism, or even violence. Drug use in
the most obvious example; gang violence sometimes occurs simply because it is
expected and rewarded by peers. Laws that are infrequently enforced will, in
such communities, be highly ineffective, because private enforcement is lacking,
and indeed private forces push hard against compliance. It is even possible to
imagine noncompliance cascades; such cascades can involve information, as
people see the violations of others, perhaps including dissident “fashion
leaders.” They can also involve reputation, as people learn that in the relevant

To know whether there will be compliance, it is important to specify the signal sent by
compliance and noncompliance. The mere enactment of law can alter that signal. For example, an
infrequently enforced law might make an actor’s conduct ambiguous where it formerly provided
a socially damaging signal. Consider, for example, a teenager who wants to buckle his seatbelt,
but who fails to do so because he does not want to signal his cowardice. A law that requires
people to buckle their belt can make a decision to buckle a reflection of compliance with law,
rather than a generalized fear. Thus the existence of the law can alter the “meaning” of
compliance, to suggest that those who comply are simply law-abiders. Similarly, those who
violate the law, under the new circumstances, are not merely courageous, but also (technically)
criminals. We can imagine circumstances in which this shift actually increases the level of
violations. But in most communities most of the time, the change will tend to bring behavior in
line.
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community, there will be no loss in the good opinion of others, and possibly
some gain, for violations.
In this light it is easy to see why there is a great deal of compliance with
legal bans on parking in handicapped spaces and on smoking in public places,
whereas there is far less compliance with legal bans on certain sexual behavior
and (in certain domains) the Internal Revenue Code.297 And it is also possible to
understand the phenomenon of civil disobedience. When those engaged in civil
disobedience are able to reach a critical mass, the law loses its authority, both as
evidence of what should be done and as evidence of what (reasonable) people
think should be done. The authority of the law is overcome by the authority of
those engaged in disobeying the law. Here conformity pressures, cascade effects,
and group polarization strongly favor disobedience.
How might government handle the troublesome situations in which
violations are both invisible and widespread? One possible remedy would be to
let people know (if it is true) of the high current levels of voluntary compliance.
Because people like to do what others do, large effects can come from reminders
that most people obey the law or avoid harmful conduct. In fact there is evidence
that taxpayers are far more likely to comply with the tax law if they believe that
most people pay their taxes voluntarily, and far less likely to do so if they believe
that noncompliance is widespread.298 A similar example may be drawn from
college campuses. Students with a penchant for “binge drinking” tend to believe
that the number of binge drinkers is higher than it is in fact. When informed of
the actual numbers, they are less likely to persist in their behavior.299 These
examples suggest that an understanding of group influences, and of the
information conveyed by the acts of others, might be enlisted in efforts to reduce
conduct that is unlawful or otherwise dangerous to self and others.
VI. Institutions and Diversity
I now turn to issues of institutional design. As we have seen, the likelihood
and consequences of conformity, cascades, and group polarization very much
See id.
Stephen Coleman, Minn. Dep't of Revenue, The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance
Experiment
State
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depend on institutional choices. Recall in particular that people are far more
likely to reveal their own information if they are rewarded for a correct group
decision rather than for a correct individual decision. In this Part, I begin with a
brief note on the relationship between dissent and war, with the suggestion that
conformity, and suppression of dissent, can undermine military preparedness. I
also explore some of the institutions of the American Constitution, suggesting
that the founders’ largest theoretical contribution consisted in their enthusiasm
for diversity and the “jarring” of diverse views in government. Turning to
contemporary issues, I discuss the role of group influences on federal judges and
the dispute over “diversity” as a justification for affirmative action in higher
education.
A. Dissent and War
I have suggested that an understanding of social influences increases
appreciation of the social role of whistleblowers and dissenters, many of whom
sacrifice their own self-interest and simultaneously benefit the public. Perhaps
the most general point here involves the role of diversity and dissent within
democratic institutions. Consider the account of Luther Gulick, a high-level
official in the Roosevelt Administration during World War II. In 1948, shortly
after the Allied victory, Gulick delivered a series of lectures, unimaginatively
titled Administrative Reflections from World War II, which offered, in some
detail, a set of observations about bureaucratic structure and administrative
reform.300 In a brief epilogue, Gulick set out to compare the warmaking capacities
of democracies with those of their Fascist adversaries.
Gulick began by noting that the initial evaluation of the United States,
among the leaders of Germany and Japan, was “not flattering.”301 We were, in
their view, “incapable of quick or effective national action even in our own
defense because under democracy we were divided by our polyglot society and
under capitalism deadlocked by our conflicting private interests.”302 Our
adversaries said that we could not fight, and they believed what they said. And
dictatorships did seem to have real advantages. They were free of delays, inertia,
and sharp internal divisions. They did not have to reckon with the opinions of a
mass of citizens, some with little education and little intelligence. Dictatorships
could also rely on a single leader and an integrated hierarchy, making it easier to
Gulick, supra note, at 120-125.
Id. at 120.
302 Id. at 121.
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develop national unity and enthusiasm, to master surprise, and to act vigorously
and with dispatch. But these claims, about the advantages of totalitarian regimes,
turned out to be “bogus.”303
The United States and its allies performed far better than Germany, Italy,
and Japan. Gulick linked their superiority directly to democracy itself, and in
particular “to the kind of review and criticism which democracy alone
affords.”304 In a totalitarian regime, plans “are hatched in secret by a small group
of partially informed men and then enforced through dictatorial authority.”305
Such plans are likely to contain fatal weaknesses. By contrast, a democracy
allows wide criticism and debate, thus avoiding “many a disaster.” In a
totalitarian system, criticisms and suggestions are neither wanted nor heeded.
“Even the leaders tend to believe their own propaganda. All of the stream of
authority and information is from the top down,” so that when change is needed,
the high command never learns of that need. But in a democracy, “the public and
the press have no hesitation in observing and criticizing the first evidence of
failure once a program has been put into operation.”306 In a democracy,
information flows within the government—between the lowest and highest
ranks—and via public opinion. Of course dissent can be muted in wartime, and
for reasons I have discussed, this muting is a mixed blessing. If everyone seems
to be on the same page, morale may be strengthened; but if disagreement is
reduced, beneficial ideas—involving the nature, scope, justice, and wisdom of
war—may be absent.
With a combination of melancholy and surprise, Gulick noted that the
United States and its allies did not show more unity than Germany, Japan, and
Italy. “The gregarious social impulses of men around the world are apparently
much the same, giving rise to the same reactions of group loyalty when men are
subjected to the same true or imagined group threats.”307 Top-down management
of mass morale, by the German and Japanese leaders, actually worked.
Dictatorships were less successful in war, not because of less loyalty or more
distrust from the public, but because leaders did not receive the checks and
corrections that come from democratic processes.
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Gulick is offering a claim here about how institutions perform better when
challenges are frequent, when people do not stifle themselves, and when
information flows freely.308 Of course Gulick is providing his personal account of
a particular set of events, and we do not really know if success in war is a
product of democratic institutions.309 The Soviet Union, for example, fought
valiantly and well, even under the tyranny of Stalin. But Gulick’s general theme
contains a great deal of truth. Institutions are far more likely to succeed if they
contain mechanisms that subject leaders to critical scrutiny and if they ensure
that courses of action will be subject to continuing monitoring and review from
outsiders310—if, in short, they use diversity and dissent to reduce the risks of
error that come from social influences.
B. Constitutional Design
These points very much bears on the design of the American Constitution,
which attempts to create a deliberative democracy, that is, a system that
combines accountability to the people with a measure of reflection and reasongiving. 311 In recent years, many people have discussed the aspiration to
deliberative democracy. Their goal has been to show that a well-functioning
system attempts to ensure not merely electoral responsiveness, but also an

In a less impressionistic vein but to the same effect, see Harrington, supra note; Janis, supra
note.
309 Compare one of the most striking findings in the last half-century of social science: In the
history of the world, no society with democratic elections and a free press has ever experienced a
famine. See Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines (1983). Famines are a product not merely of food
scarcity, but of social responses to food scarcity. A democratic government, checked by the press,
is likely to take all reasonable measures to prevent mass starvation, if only because it needs to do
so to stay in office. At the same time, a free society, facing the risk of famine, is likely to have a
great deal of information, at every stage, about the level of the emerging problem and the
effectiveness of current or possible responses. If famine relief efforts plans “are hatched in secret
by a small group of partially informed men and then enforced through dictatorial authority,”
failure is far more likely. Or consider the problem of “witch-hunts” – mass movements, led by
political leaders, against internal conspiracies. As the McCarthy period demonstrates, witchhunts are hardly impossible in democracies. But they are far more likely in a system in which the
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exchange of reasons in the public sphere.312 In a deliberative democracy, the
exercise of public power must be justified by reasons, not merely by the will of
some segment of society, and indeed not merely by the will of the majority. Both
the opponents and the advocates of the Constitution were firmly committed to
political deliberation. They also considered themselves “republicans,” committed
to a high degree of self-government.313 But deliberative democracies can come in
many different forms, The framers’ greatest innovation consisted not in their
belief in deliberation, which uncontested at the time, but in their fear of
homogeneity, their enthusiasm for diversity, and their effort to accommodate
and to structure that diversity. In the founding period, a large part of the nation’s
discussion turned on the possibility of having that form of government in a
nation with its heterogeneous citizenry.
The antifederalists, opponents of the proposed Constitution, thought that
this was impossible. Thus Brutus, an especially articulate advocate of the
antifederalist view, spoke for the classical tradition when he urged: “In a
republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar.
If this be not the case, there will be constant clashing of opinions; and the
representatives of one part will be continually striving against those of the
other.”314 The advocates of the Constitution believed that Brutus had it exactly
backwards. They welcomed the diversity and the “constantly clashing of
opinions” and affirmatively sought a situation in which “the representatives of
one part will be continually striving against those of the other.” Alexander
Hamilton spoke most clearly on the point, urging that the” differences of
opinion, and the jarring of parties in [the legislative] department of the
government . . . often promote deliberation and circumspection; and serve to
check the excesses of the majority.”315 From the standpoint of political
See, e.g, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (1999).
See Bessette, supra note.
314 2 The Complete Antifederalist 269 (H. Storing ed. 1980).
315 The Federalist No. 70, at 426-37 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). Compare
Asch’s claim: “The clash of views generates events of far-reaching importance. I am induced to
take up a particular standpoint, to view my own action as another views it . . . Now I have within
me two standpoints, my own and that of the other; both are now part of my way of thinking. In
this way the limitations of my individual thinking are transcended by including the thoughts of
others. I am now open to more alternatives than my own unaided comprehension would make
possible. Disagreements, when their causes are intelligible, can enrich and strengthen, rather than
injure, our sense of objectivity.” Solomon Asch, Social Psychology 131-32 (1952). From a quite
different discipline, John Rawls writes in similar terms: “In everyday life the exchange of opinion
with others checks our partiality and widens our perspective; we are made to see things form the
standpoint of others and the limits of our vision are brought home to us. . . . The benefits from
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deliberation, the central problem is that widespread error and social
fragmentation are likely to result when like-minded people, insulated from
others, move in extreme directions simply because of limited argument pools
and parochial influences. A Constitution that ensures the “jarring of parties” and
“differences of opinion” will provide safeguards against unjustified movements
of view.
A similar point emerges from one of the most illuminating early debates,
raising the question whether the bill of rights should include a “right to instruct”
representatives. That right was defended with the claim that citizens of a
particular region ought to have the authority to bind their representatives about
how to vote. This defense might seem plausible as a way of improving the
political accountability of representatives—and so it seemed to many at the time.
But there is a problem with this view, especially in an era in which political
interest was closely aligned with geography. In such an era, it is likely that the
citizens of a particular region, influenced by one another’s views, might end up
with indefensible positions, very possibly as a result of its own insularity,
leading to cascade effects and group polarization. In rejecting the right to
instruct, Roger Sherman gave the decisive argument:
“[T]he words are calculated to mislead the people, by conveying an idea
that they have a right to control the debates of the Legislature. This cannot be
admitted to be just, because it would destroy the object of their meeting. I think,
when the people have chosen a representative, it is his duty to meet others from
the different parts of the Union, and consult, and agree with them on such acts as
are for the general benefit of the whole community. If they were to be guided by
instructions, there would be no use in deliberation.”316

discussion lie in the fact that even representative legislators are limited in knowledge and the
ability to reason. No one of them knows everything the others know, or can make all the same
inferences that they can draw in concert. Discussion is a way of combining information and
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there are many who contribute to the process of deliberation, each can bring his share of
goodness and moral prudence; . . . some appreciate one part, some another, and all together
appreciate all.” Aristotle, Politics 123 (E. Barker trans. 1972). Much of my discussion here has
been devoted to showing why and under what circumstances this view might or might not be
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Sherman’s words reflect the founders’ general receptivity to deliberation
among people who are quite diverse and who disagree on issues both large and
small. Indeed, it was through deliberation among such persons that “such acts as
are for the general benefit of the whole community” would emerge.
Most important, the institutions of the Constitution reflect a fear of group
influences, cascade effects, and polarization, creating a range of checks on illconsidered judgments that emerge from those processes. The most obvious
example is bicameralism, designed as a safeguard against a situation in which
one house—in the framers’ view, most likely the House of Representatives—
would be overcome by short-term passions and even group polarization. This
was the point made by Hamilton in endorsing a “jarring of parties” within the
legislature. James Wilson's great lectures on law spoke of bicameralism very
much in these terms, referring to "instances, in which the people have become
the miserable victims of passions, operating on their government without
restraint," and seeing a "single legislature" as prone to "sudden and violent fits of
despotism, injustice, and cruelty."317 To be sure, a cascade can cross the
boundaries that separate the Senate from the House; such crossings do occur. But
their different compositions and cultures provide a significant safeguard against
warrantless cascades. Here the Senate was thought to be especially important.
Consider the widely reported story that on his return from France, Jefferson
called Washington to account at the breakfast-table for having agreed to a second
chamber. "Why, asked Washington, "did you pour that coffee into your saucer?"
"To cool it," quoth Jefferson. "Even so," said Washington, "we pour legislation
into the senatorial saucer to cool it."318
We can understand many aspects of the system of checks and balances in
the same general terms. The duty to present legislation to the President protects
against cascade effects within the legislative branch.319 Because law cannot
operate against citizens without the concurrence of the legislative and executive
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branches, enacting and then enforcing the law, there is a further safeguard
against oppression. Federalism itself was, and remains, an engine of diversity,
creating “circuit breakers” in the form of a variety of sovereigns with separate
cultures. In the federal system, social influences may produce error in some
states, and states can certainly fall into cascades.320 But the existence of separate
systems creates some check on the diffusion of error.321
Judicial power itself was understood in related terms, quite outside of the
context of constitutional review; consider Hamilton’s account322:
“But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only that the
independence of judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of
occasional ill humours in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to
the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and
partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistry is of vast importance
in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such laws. It not only
serves the moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been
passed, but it operates as a check upon the legislative body in passing them;
who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of an iniquitous intention are to be
expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled by the very
motives of the injustice they mediate, to qualify their attempts.”
Of course the Constitution’s explicit protection of freedom of speech, and
its implicit protection of freedom of association,323 help to ensure spaces for
diversity and dissent. In that way, they counteract some of the risks of mistake
that stem from group influences. For present purposes, the analysis of free
speech is straightforward, but it is worth emphasizing that freedom of expression
diminishes the gap between a nation’s leaders and its citizens, and for that
reason promotes monitoring of the former by the latter.324 James Madison, the
author of the first amendment, used this point to object to the whole idea of a
“Sedition Act,” criminalizing certain forms of criticism of public officials.
Madison urged that “the right of electing the members of the Government
constitutes . . . the essence of a free and responsible government,” and that the
“value and efficacy of this right depends on the knowledge of the comparative
See Kuran and Sunstein, supra note.
See Michael McConnell, Evaluating the Founders’ Design, U. Chi. L. Rev.; Lynn Baker and
Ernest Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 Duke LJ 75 (1999).
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merits and demerits of the candidates for the public trust.”325 If group influences
are kept in mind, one implication is that government might in some settings have
a legitimate interest in introducing diversity of opinion into domains that that
otherwise consist of like-minded people. The reason is simply to diminish the
risks of error. If modern technologies allow people to sort themselves into
congenial communities, there is a risk that people will be insulated from
competing views.326 Perhaps government should be entitled to respond. Of
course any such efforts, on government’s part, will introduce first amendment
problems of its own.327
Freedom of association presents some important wrinkles. An
understanding of group polarization suggests that associational freedom can
produce significant risks, above all because like-minded people might, by the
laws of social interactions, end up in unjustifiably extreme directions. Society
might well become fragmented as a result of “iterated polarization games,” in
which groups of like-minded people—initially different, but not terribly
different, from one another—drive their members toward increasingly diverse
positions. Small differences in initial views might well be magnified, through
social interactions, into very large ones.328 An advantage of this process is that
serves to increase society’s stock of “argument pools”; but it also increases the
likelihood of mutual suspicion, misunderstanding, and even hatred. At the same
time, freedom of association helps to counteract the informational and
reputational influences that might well lead people to fail to disclose
information, preferences, and values. By allowing a wide diversity of
communities, imposing pressures of quite different kinds, freedom of association
increases the likelihood that at some point, important information will be
disclosed and eventually spread.329
Nothing in this brief account means that the American Constitution, as
originally ratified or as now understood, contains the ideal institutions and
rights for balancing diversity with other goals, including stability. Some people,
James Madison, Report of 1800, January 7, 1800, in 17 Papers of JamesMaison (David Mattern
et al. eds., 1991), at 346, 344.
326 See Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.com (2002), for general discussion.
327 See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 US 241 (1974) (striking down a right-of-reply
law).
328 See Henrich et al., supra note, at 353, for some entertaining examples in the context of food
choice.
329 This is one reading of Holmes’ great dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 US
616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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for example, argue on behalf of proportional representation,330 either of
demographic groups or of a large number of parties, and it is possible to
understand those arguments as responsive to the goal of guaranteeing a wide
range of ideas in government. Efforts to ensure that disadvantaged groups are
represented as such might be urged on this ground.331 In some nations, there
have been serious attempts to ensure equal representation for women, in large
part on the ground that without such representation, important points of view
will be absent. There is much to be said about this large topic.332 But to anchor the
discussion, I now turn to two more particular issues, both of considerable
contemporary concern: diversity on the federal judiciary and affirmative action
in higher education.
C. Judges
1. Data. Are judges subject to conformity effects? Are they likely to
cascade? Do like-minded judges move to extremes? What is the effect of
anticipated and actual dissents? For obvious reasons this is not an easy topic to
investigate. But consider judicial behavior on the D.C. Circuit.333 A panel of three
Republican judges is far more likely to strike down agency action, at the behest
of industry, than a panel of two Republicans and one Democrat. At the
individual level, group influences are at least equally striking: When sitting with
two Republicans, a Democratic judge is more likely to vote to strike down
agency action than is a Republican when sitting with two Democrats. It does not
much matter whether the judge of a single party is actually persuaded or instead
decides that it is simply not worthwhile to dissent publicly. In either case, the
vote reflects social influences, in a process that is not entirely different from what
is observed in the Asch experiments.334

See Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (1995); Iris Young, Justice and the Politics of
Difference 183-91 (1994).
331 See id; Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble, supra note.
332 See note supra.
333 See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the DC Circuit, 83 Va L Rev
1717 (1997); Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine, 107 Yale LJ 2155 (1998).
334 It is not identical, of course. A public dissent takes considerable time and effort, and it might
also strain collegial relations. Neither of these is involved in the same way in the Asch
experiments.
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Several studies find a strong tendency toward more extreme results when
a panel consists of judges from a single political party.335 The background fact is
that when industry challenges an environmental regulation, there is an
extraordinary difference between the behavior of a Republican majority and that
of a Democratic majority. Republican majorities reverse agencies over 50% of the
time; Democratic majorities do so less than 15% of the time.336 There are also
significant findings of group influence. Judges’ votes are greatly affected by
whether there is another judge, on that panel, appointed by a president from the
same political party. A Republican judge is much more likely to accept an
industry challenge if she has a Republican colleague on the panel. A Democratic
judge is far less likely to accept such a challenge if she has a Democratic
colleague on the panel.337 Hence a single Democratic judge, accompanied by two
Republicans, votes in favor of industry challenges over 40% of the time; but
when joined by one or more Democrats, the Democratic judge votes in favor of
such challenges less than 30% of the time.338
By contrast, a single Republican votes in favor of industry challenges less
than 20% of the time.339 Remarkably, a single Republican, accompanied by two
Democrats, is less likely to accept an industry challenge than a single Democrat,
accompanied by two Republicans. This is a real testimony to the strength of
group influences (and also judicial reluctance to dissent publicly, either because
it can be difficult and time-consuming to produce a dissent or because dissenting
can seem an antisocial act). It might seem reasonable to say that a Democrat,
sitting with two Republicans, votes like a Republican, whereas a Republican,
sitting with two Democrats, votes like a Democrat. This view is not entirely
wrong, but it is misleading. The problem is that how a Democrat votes, and how
a Republican votes, is very much a function of whether they are accompanied by
one or two people from their own party, or none at all.340 For this reason, there is
no single way, independent of group influences, that either a Republican or
Democrat tends to vote—at least in the context of industry challenges to agency
regulations.

See my own data, described below, and Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the DC
Circuit, 85 Va L Rev 805, 808 (1999).
336 Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the DC Circuit, 85 Va L Rev 805, 808 (1999).
337 See id. at 808 (1999).
338 Calculated from Revesz, supra note, at 1752.
339 Id. at 1754.
340 Id.
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In a testimonial to group polarization, a panel of three Republican judges
is far more likely than a panel of two Republicans and one Democrat to reverse
an environmental decision when industry challenges that decision.341 In one
period (1995 to 2002), 71% of Republican votes, on all-Republican panels,
accepted industry challenges.342 By contrast, 45% of Republican votes, on two-toone Republican panels, accepted such challenges—and 37.5% of such votes did
so on two-to-one Republican panels.343 In a earlier period (1986-1994), the
corresponding numbers were 80%, 48%, and 14%.344 In a still earlier period (19701982), 100% of Republicans votes, on all-Republican panels, were in favor of
industry challenges. By contrast, only 45% of Republican votes, on two-to-one
Republican panels, were in favor of industry challenges—and only 26% of
Republican votes, on Democratic-dominated panels, were in favor of such
challenges.345
Aggregating this data, we can produce a broadly representative and
nearly complete account of votes, within the D.C. Circuit, in environmental cases
between 1979 and 2002. A simple calculation shows that in all-Republican panels,
Republicans voted to accept industry challenges 80% of the time; that in two-toone Republican panels, Republicans voted to accept such challenges 48% of the
time; and that in two-to-one Democratic panels, Republicans voted to accept
industry challenges only 27.5 of the time. And group polarization is hardly
limited to Republican judges; it occurs among Democratic judges as well. When
an environmental group is challenging agency action, a panel of three Democrats
is more likely to accept the challenge than a panel of two Democrats and one
Republican.346 The likelihood that a Democrat will vote in favor of an

See my own unpublished data (on file); Revesz, supra note, at 1754.
Unpublished data (on file).
343 Id.
344 Revesz, supra, at 1754. Two findings that I have emphasized might seem in tension with one
another. Democratic judges, sitting without fellow Democrats, are highly likely to be influenced
by two Republican colleagues; but Democratic judges, in such cases, also have a powerful
restraining effect on their colleagues. The explanation appears to be that in such cases, the
influence of the two Republicans on the single Democrat produces a substantial number of
unanimous panel decisions in favor of reversal, while at the same time, the prospect of a
Democratic dissent, also in a significant percentage of cases, dramatically cuts the total
percentage of Republican votes in favor of industry. A reasonable speculation is that if the single
Democrat does not feel strongly, he will yield to group pressure, and the panel is likely to
reverse; but if the Democrat feels strongly, and the Republicans do not, the Republicans will shift,
and the agency will be upheld.
345 Id. at 1754.
346 Id. at 1753.
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environmentalist challenge is highest when three Democrats are on the panel—
and lowest when the panel has two Republicans.347
A third study is more complicated.348 Under the Supreme Court’s decision
in Chevron v. NRDC,349 courts are supposed to uphold agency interpretations of
law so long as the interpretations are “reasonable.” But when do courts actually
uphold such interpretations? The doctrine allows judges considerable room to
maneuver, so that courts that are inclined to invalidate agency action usually can
find a plausible basis for doing so. The real question is when they will claim to
have found that plausible basis. The second study strongly suggests that group
influences play a role and that the potential for a dissent, from a Democratic
judge, is a strong deterrent to Republican judges who are inclined to invalidate
agency action. As a background fact, note that the study finds an exceedingly
strong influence, within the influential court of appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, of party affiliation on outcomes. If observers were to code
cases very crudely, by taking account of whether industry or a public interest
group is bringing the challenge, they would find that a majority of Republicans
reach a conservative judgment 54% of the time, whereas a majority of Democrats
reach such a judgment merely 32% of the time.350
For present purposes, the most important finding is that there is a
dramatic difference between politically diverse panels, with judges appointed by
Presidents of more than one party, and politically unified panels, with judges
appointed by Presidents of only one party. On divided panels in which a
Republican majority of the court might be expected, on broadly speaking
political grounds, to be hostile to the agency, the court nonetheless deferred to
the agency 62% of the time. But on unified panels in which an all-Republican
panel might be expected to be hostile to the agency, the court upheld the
agency’s interpretation only 33% of the time. Note that this was the only such
finding in the data. When Democratic majority courts were expected to uphold
the agency’s decision on political grounds, they did so over 70% of the time,
whether unified (71% of the time) or divided (86% of the time). Consider the
results in tabular form351:

Id.
Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine, 107
Yale LJ 2155 (1998).
349 See 467 US 837 (1984).
350 Cross and Tiller, supra note, at 2169.
351 Constructed on the basis of data in Cross and Tiller, supra note, at 2172-2173.
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3–0
Republican
Panel

2–1
Republican
Panel

3–0
Democratic
Panel

2–1
Democratic
Panel

33%

62%

71%

86%

67%

38%

29%

14%

Uphold
Agency
Action
Invalidate
Agency
Action

It seems reasonable to speculate that the seemingly bizarre result—a 67%
invalidation rate when Republican judges are unified—reflects group influences
and in particular group polarization. A group of all-Republican judges might
well take the relatively unusual step of rejecting an agency’s interpretation,
whereas a divided panel, with a built-in check on any tendency toward the
unusual or extreme outcome, is more likely to take the conventional route. A
likely reason is that the single Democratic judge acts as a “whistleblower,”
discouraging the other judges from making a decision that is in tension with the
Supreme Court’s command to uphold agency interpretations of ambiguous
statutes.352 And other factors are involved. When a court consists of a panel of
judges with the same basic orientation, the median view, before deliberation
begins, will be significantly different from what it would be with a panel of
diverse judges. The argument pool will be very different as well. For example, a
panel of three Republican judges, tentatively inclined to invalidate the action of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), will offer a range of arguments in
support of invalidation and relatively few in the other direction—even if the law,
properly interpreted, favors validation. If the panel contains a judge who is
inclined to uphold the EPA, the arguments that favor validation are far more
likely to emerge and to be pressed. Indeed, the very fact that the judge is a
Democrat increases the likelihood that this will occur, since that judge might not
think of himself as being part of the same “group” as the other panel members.
(Recall that when people are connected by ties of solidarity, disagreement is all
the less likely.) And because corroboration of opinion leads to greater confidence
and hence extremity, it is not surprising that a panel of three like-minded judges
would lead to unusual and extreme results.
In this context, the effect is fortified by the possibility that the sole judge,
finding himself outnumbered, might produce a dissenting opinion in public. To
352

See id. at 2174-76.
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be sure, Supreme Court review is rare and in the general run of cases, the
prospect of such review probably does not have much of a deterrent effect on
courts of appeals. But judges who write majority opinions are usually not
enthusiastic about having to see and to respond to dissenting opinions. And if
the law actually favors the dissenting view, two judges, even if they would like
to reverse the Environmental Protection Agency, might be influenced to adopt
the easier course of validation. The evidence so suggests.353
A glance at the table immediately above offers some countervailing data:
A panel of three Democrats is not more likely than a panel with two Democrats
to uphold agency action in cases in which Democrats might be expected to want
to uphold the agency. And in the context of a challenge from an environmental
group, a Republican judge is not likely to vote differently if he is accompanied by
two Democrats, one Republican, or two Republicans.354 But in some important
domains, at least, a panel of three like-minded judges will indeed behave
differently from a panel with two. It would be most interesting to learn what
pattern would be observed in other contexts. What does the evidence show if, in
criminal cases, we compare panels of three Democratic judges with panels
containing two Democrats and one Republican? Are the three Democrats far
more inclined to reverse a criminal conviction than a panel with one Republican?
In any case the basic claim here can generate hypotheses about a wide range of
areas. We might hypothesize, for example, that all-Republican panels would not
be enthusiastic about sex discrimination claims, and that all-Democratic panels
show far more sympathy for such claims. Perhaps all-Democratic panels would
be particularly skeptical about claims that government regulation amounts to an
unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation. Perhaps
all-Republican panels would show unusual enthusiasm for such claims.
At this point a skeptic might note that lawyers make adversarial
presentations before judges. Such a skeptic might insist that the size of the
“argument pool” is determined by those presentations, not only and not even
mostly by what members of the panel are inclined to say and to do. And
undoubtedly the inclinations of judges are shaped, some of the time, by the
contributions of advocates. But even if this is so, what matters, for purposes of
the outcomes, is the inclinations of judges, whatever they are based on; and it is
here that the existence of a single dissenter can make all the difference. In the
punitive damage study discussed above, mock juries were presented with
353
354
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arguments from both sides, and polarization followed this presentation, as it has
elsewhere.355 Notice in this regard that for polarization hypothesis to hold, it is
not necessary to know whether judges spend a great deal of time offering
reasons to one another. Mere exposure to a conclusion is enough.356 A system of
simple votes, unaccompanied by reasons, should incline judges to polarize. Of
course reasons, if they are good ones, are likely to make those votes especially
persuasive.
2. The normative issue. It remains to investigate the normative issues. If
like-minded judges go to extremes, should we be troubled? Is it good if a large
effect is found from a single judge from a different party? More generally: Is
there reason to attempt to ensure diversity on the federal courts? To promote a
degree of diversity on panels? There is a widespread view that judges appointed
by presidents of different political parties are not fundamentally different and
that once on the bench, judges frequently surprise those who nominated them.357
The view is not entirely baseless, but it is misleading. Some appointees do
disappoint the Presidents who nominated them, but the availability heuristic
should not fool us into thinking that these examples are typical. Judges
appointed by Republican presidents are quite different from judges appointed by
Democratic presidents. “Partisanship clearly affects how appellate courts review
agency discretion.”358
But it seems difficult to evaluate the underlying issues without taking a
stand on the merits—without knowing what we want judges to do. Suppose that
three Republican judges are especially likely to uphold criminal convictions, and
that three Democratic judges are especially likely to reverse those convictions. At
first glance, one or the other is troubling only if we know whether we approve of
one or another set of results. In the punitive damage study discussed above, the
movement toward increased awards might be something to celebrate, not to
deplore, if we conclude that the median of predeliberation awards is too low and
that the increase, produced by group discussion, ensures more sensible awards.
And if a view about what judges should do is the only possible basis for
evaluation, we might conclude that those who prefer judges of a particular party
should seek judges of that party, and that group influences are essentially beside
the point.

Schkade, supra note, at 1150 and 1150 n. 44.
See Robert Baron et al., supra note, at 74.
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But the conclusion is too strong. In some cases, the law, properly
interpreted, really does argue strongly for one or another view. The existence of
diversity on a panel is likely to bring that fact to light and perhaps to move the
panel’s decision in the direction of what the law requires. The existence of
politically diverse judges, and of a potential dissent, increases the probability
that the law will be followed. The Chevron study, referred to above, strongly
supports this point.359 The presence of a potential dissenter—in the form of a
judge appointed by a president from another political party—creates a possible
whistleblower who can reduce the likelihood of an incorrect or lawless
decision.360 Through an appreciation of the nature of group influences, we can
see the wisdom in an old idea: A decision is more likely to be right, and less
likely to be political in a pejorative sense, if it is supported by judges with
different predilections.
There is a further point. Suppose that in many areas, it is not clear, in
advance, whether the appointees of Democratic or Republican presidents are
correct. Suppose that we are genuinely uncertain. If so, there is reason to favor a
situation in which the legal system has both, simply on the ground that through
that route, more (reasonable) opinions are likely to be heard. And if we are
genuinely uncertain, there is reason to favor a mix of views merely by virtue of
its moderating effect. In the face of uncertainty, sensible people choose between
the poles.361
3. An analogy. Consider an analogy. Modern law and policy is often made
by independent regulatory commissions, such as the Federal Trade Commission,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations Board,
and the Federal Communications Commission. Much of the time, such agencies
act through adjudication. They function in the same fashion as federal courts.
And under federal statutes, Congress has attempted to ensure that these agencies
are not monopolized by either Democrats or Republicans. The law requires that
no more than a bare majority of agency members may be from a single party.362
An understanding of group influences helps explain this requirement. An
independent agency that is all-Democratic, or all-Republican, might move
toward an extreme position, indeed a position that is more extreme than that of
See Cross and Tiller, supra note.
This is the explanation in Cross and Tiller, supra note, at 2173.
361 For evidence, see Mark Kelman et al., Context-Independence in Legal Decisionmaking, in
Behavioral Law and Economics (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000).
362 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994).
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the median Democrat or Republican, and possibly more extreme than that of any
agency official standing alone. A requirement of bipartisan membership can
operate as a check against movements of this kind. Congress was apparently
aware of this general point. Closely attuned to the policymaking functions of the
relevant institutions, it was careful to provide a safeguard against extreme
movements.
Why do we fail to create similar safeguards for courts? Part of the answer
must lie in a belief that unlike heads of independent regulatory commissions,
judges are not policymakers. Their duty is to follow the law, not to make policy.
An attempt to ensure bipartisan composition would seem inconsistent with the
commitment to this belief. But the evidence I have discussed shows judges are
policymakers of an important kind, and that their political commitments very
much influence their votes. In principle, there is good reason to attempt to ensure
a mix of perspectives within courts of appeals.
Of course the idea of diversity, or of a mix of perspectives, is hardly selfdefining. It would not be appropriate to say that the federal judges should
include people who refuse to obey the Constitution, or who refuse to exercise the
power of judicial review, or who think that the Constitution allows suppression
of political dissent and racial segregation. Here as elsewhere, the domain of
appropriate diversity is limited. What is necessary is reasonable diversity, or
diversity of reasonable views, and not diversity as such. People can certainly
disagree about what reasonable diversity entails in this context. All that I am
suggesting here is that there is such a thing as reasonable diversity, and that it is
important to ensure that judges, no less than anyone else, are exposed to it, and
not merely through the arguments of advocates.
4. The Senate’s role. These points cast fresh light on a much disputed
issue: the legitimate role of the Senate in giving “advice and consent” to
presidential appointments to the federal judiciary. Above all, an understanding
of social influences suggests that the Senate has a responsibility to exercise its
constitutional authority in order to ensure a reasonable diversity of view. The
Constitution’s history fully contemplates an independent role for the Senate in
the selection of Supreme Court Justices.363 That independent role certainly
authorizes the Senate to consider the general approach, and likely pattern of
votes, of potential judges. There can be no doubt that the President considers the
See David A. Strauss and Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation
Process, 101 Yale L.J. 1491 (1992).
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general approach of his nominees; the Senate is entitled to do so as well. Under
good conditions, these simultaneous powers would bring about a healthy form
of checks and balances, permitting each branch to counter the other. Indeed, that
system is part and parcel of social deliberation about the direction of the federal
judiciary.
Why might this view be rejected? It could be urged that there is only one
legitimate approach to constitutional or statutory interpretation—that, for
example, some version of originalism or textualism is the only such approach,
and that anyone who rejects that view is unreasonable. For true believers, it is
pointless to argue for diverse views.364 Diversity is not necessary, or even
valuable, if we already know what should be done, and if competing views
would simply cloud the issue. (In a scientific dispute, it is not helpful to include
those who believe that the earth is flat.) Or it might be urged that a deferential
role for the Senate, combined with natural political competition and cycles, will
produce a sensible mix over time. I do not deny this possibility. My only
suggestions are that a high degree of diversity on the federal judiciary is
desirable, that the Senate is entitled to pursue diversity, and that without such
diversity, judicial panels are will inevitably go in unjustified directions.
D. Affirmative Action in Higher Education
Countless educational institutions pursue the goal of diversity. Most of
America’s large private and public institutions seek a wide range of views,
faculty, and students. There are some prominent exceptions; some institutions
pride themselves on a high degree of homogeneity.365 And here as elsewhere, the
idea of diversity needs to be clarified. Colleges and universities do not make
special efforts to include students who collect Britney Spears memorabilia, hate
America, smell bad, or have low SAT’s. Such institutions are committed to
diversity, but only to a certain degree and of a certain kind. It remains possible to
urge, as many do, that they give excessive attention to diversity of some kinds
and insufficient attention to diversity of other kinds. The only point I am making
here is that they tend to be committed to diversity of a recognizable sort.

Note, however, that even if it would be appropriate for all judges to share a certain approach,
it is also desirable to have diversity with respect to the application of that approach. Textualists
do not all agree with one another; there is internal diversity in the world of originalism. Diversity
is appropriate here to ensure an airing of reasonable views.
365 See the discussion of Brigham Young University in Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity
(1999).
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There are many reasons for this commitment. One involves simple market
pressures; a school that has different sorts of students is more likely to be able to
attract good faculty and good students.366 Of course people’s preferences and
values vary, and some people want to go to places that are relatively
homogeneous. But this seems to be the exception rather than the rule.367 And
there is another justification for diversity, one that has received considerable
attention within courts368 and that is closely related to my topic here. The idea is
that education is simply likely to be better if the school has people with different
views, perspectives, and experiences. In the context of affirmative action, this
justification was approved in Justice Powell’s decisive opinion in the Bakke
case,369 an opinion that has the unusual distinction of having settled, for a period
of decades, the constitutionality of affirmative action in higher education without
having been embraced by any other justice on the Supreme Court. My goal here
is to offer a qualified defense of Justice Powell’s view. I urge that in some
educational settings, racial diversity is important for ensuring a broad array of
experiences and ideas, and that in those settings, narrowly tailored affirmative
action programs should be constitutionally permissible.
Justice Powell insisted that a diverse student body is a constitutionally
acceptable goal for higher education.370 The central reason is that universities
should be allowed to ensure a “robust exchange of ideas,” an interest connected
with the first amendment itself.371 Justice Powell acknowledged that this interest
seemed strongest in the context of undergraduate education, where views are
formed on a large number of topics. But even in a medical school, “the
contribution of diversity is substantial.”372 A medical student having a particular
background, including a particular ethnic background, “may bring to a
Note that this justification is most unlikely to be legitimate as a constitutional matter. A public
institution is not permitted to justify discrimination by claiming, or even showing, that many of
its constituents call for it. Brown v. Bd. of Education itself requires that conclusion; see also
Palmore v. Sadoti, 466 US 429, 441 (1984), suggesting that private “biases may be outside the
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”
367 Recall the prior qualifications about the definition of diversity. Even apparently diverse
institutions are homogenous in certain ways and along certain dimensions, and this is what
students and faculty seem to prefer.
368 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996); Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th
Cir. 2002).
369 See 438 US 265 (1978 (opinion of Powell, J.).
370 438 US at 311-12.
371 Id. at 313.
372 Id.
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professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the
training of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with
understanding their vital service to humanity.”373 Justice Powell also emphasized
that doctors “serve a heterogeneous population,” and suggested that graduate
admissions decisions are concerned with contributions that follow formal
education.374
Thus Justice Powell concluded that the crucial question was whether a
race-conscious admission program, giving benefits to people because they are
members of racial minority groups, was a necessary means of promoting the
legitimate goal of diversity. Here he reached his famous conclusion that racial or
ethnic background could be a “plus” in the admissions decision, though quotas
would not be allowed.375 For Justice Powell, a legitimate admissions program
should be “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light
of the particular qualifications of the applicant, and to place them on the same
footing for consideration, although not necessarily according to them the same
weight.”376 Thus it would be acceptable to promote “beneficial educational
pluralism” by considering a range of factors, including “demonstrated
compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with
the poor, or other qualifications deemed important.”377
My central concern here is the principal378 basis for Justice Powell’s
conclusion: the value of ensuring a “robust exchange of ideas” in the classroom,
and the legitimacy of promoting racial diversity in order to ensure that
exchange. To understand the contemporary relevance of Justice Powell’s opinion,
it is necessary to outline the recent developments in the constitutional principles
governing affirmative action programs. The Court has now settled on the view
that affirmative action programs, like all other programs embodying racial
discrimination, should be subject to “strict scrutiny” from courts, and invalidated
unless they are the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state
Id. at 314.
Id.
375 Id. at 316-320.
376 Id. at 317.
377 Id.
378 This is not the exclusive basis for Justice Powell’s opinion; he was also concerned with what
will happen after graduation – with the possibility that members of minority groups will serve
their communities, in a way that confers significant social benefits on populations that might
otherwise be underserved. Id. For evidence that this does happen, see John Bowen and Derek
Bok, The Shape of the River (1998).
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interest.379 It is also clear that past “societal discrimination,” meaning
discrimination in the nation’s past, is not a legitimate basis for discrimination
against whites.380 It is equally clear that narrow, remedial affirmative action
programs are acceptable if they are specifically designed to correct for proven
past discrimination by the institution that is acting affirmatively.381
What remains unclear is when, if ever, a public institution is permitted to
justify affirmative action by reference to “forward-looking” justifications, not
involving a remedy for past discrimination.382 A state might, for example, try to
defend affirmative action in hiring police by urging that a police force will
simply be more effective if it contains African-Americans among others—
especially in a community that contains people of multiple races.383 Justice Powell
was really offering a similar claim about higher education: Whether or not a
college or university has itself discriminated against African-Americans or
others, it should permitted to discriminate in favor of them if it is doing so as a
means of ensuring a “robust exchange of ideas.” But current justices have given
conflicting signals about the legitimacy and strength of forward-looking
justifications.384
See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 US 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515
US 200 (1995).
380 City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 US 469, 477 (1989).
381 United States v. Paradise, 480 US 149 (1987); Local No. 93, International Association of
Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 US 616 (1987).
382 For general discussion, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's
Affirmative Action Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 78, 96 (1986): "Public and private employers might
choose to implement affirmative action for many reasons other than to purge their own past sins
of discrimination. The Jackson school board, for example, said it had done so in part to improve
the quality of education in Jackson -- whether by improving black students' performance or by
dispelling for black and white students alike any idea that white supremacy governs our social
institutions. Other employers might advance different forward-looking reasons for affirmative
action: improving their services to black constituencies, averting racial tension over the allocation
of jobs in a community, or increasing the diversity of a work force, to name but a few examples.
Or they might adopt affirmative action simply to eliminate from their operations all de facto
embodiment of a system of racial caste. All of these reasons aspire to a racially integrated future,
but none reduces to 'racial balancing for its own sake.'"
383 Id.
384 For one view, see Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647 (1987) (Stevens,
concurring): “Instead of retroactively scrutinizing his own or society's possible exclusions of
minorities in the past to determine the outer limits of a valid affirmative-action program -- or
indeed, any particular affirmative-action decision -- in many cases the employer will find it more
appropriate to consider other legitimate reasons to give preferences to members of
underrepresented groups. Statutes enacted for the benefit of minority groups should not block
these forward-looking considerations.” For a contrasting view, see Justice O'Connor, in Metro
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There can be no doubt that universities are permitted to promote diversity
and dissent by seeking a mix of faculty and students. Efforts of this kind are
pervasive; this is what most admissions offices try to do. To be sure, some
serious free speech issues might be raised if an admissions office discriminates in
favor of, or against, particular points of view.385 But even if public institutions are
barred from pursuing diversity of ideas by discriminating directly against some
points of view, such institutions are surely permitted, without offending the first
amendment, to seek a variety of backgrounds and experiences, in the hope that
better discussions will result. If Justice Powell is right, affirmative action
programs can be similarly justified. The simple idea here is that diverse
populations are likely to increase the range of thoughts and perspectives, and to
reduce the risks of conformity, cascades, and polarization associated with group
influences.386 We have seen that on the judiciary, judges with diverse views can
act as “whistleblowers,” correcting ill-considered views of the law. In
educational institutions, a high degree of diversity, including racial diversity,
often has the same effect. A racially uniform class is all too likely to polarize to an
unjustified position, simply because students’ antecedent views are not subject to
critical scrutiny.
For example, we can easily imagine all-white classrooms, discussing the
issue of racial profiling, in which the absence of racial diversity is a serious
problem. Those who have not had bad experiences, as a result of such profiling,
will lack crucial information. Return here to Justice O’Connor’s comments on
Justice Marshall: “Justice Marshall brought a special perspective. . . . His was the
mouth of a man who knew the anguish of the silenced and gave them a voice. . . .
Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 US 547, 612 (1990), joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy:
“Modern equal protection has recognized only one [compelling state] interest: remedying the
effects of racial discrimination. The interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is
clearly not a compelling interest. It is simply too amorphous, too insubstantial, and too unrelated
to any legitimate basis for employing racial classifications.”
385 I am unaware of any first amendment challenge to a university’s efforts to promote diversity
by promoting a range of views, even though such efforts would necessarily involve
discrimination against some views and in favor of others. But there are some hard questions
lurking here. One set of questions involve the sheer difficulty of proof: In a case in which a
student is or is not denied admission, the applicant’s political view will undoubtedly be one of a
range of factors, and it will be hard to isolate, in a challenge, point of view as the decisive factor.
In a case of discharge or suspension as a result of political view, there would indeed be a
constitutional problem. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 US 563, 568 (1968).
386 For supportive evidence, see Patricia Gurin, Reports Submitted on Behalf of the University of
Michigan: the Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education, 5 Mich J Race & Law 363
(1999).
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I have been perhaps most personally affected by Justice Marshall as a raconteur .
. . . Occasionally, at Conference meetings, I still catch myself looking expectantly
for his raised brow and his twinkling eye, hoping to hear, just once more, another
story that would, by and by, perhaps change the way I see the world.”387 What
was true for Justice O’Connor is true for white students in many educational
settings. In the context of racial profiling, and in many other imaginable cases, a
degree of racial diversity is likely to bring to bear valuable information and
perspectives. These may change how the group sees the world, whether or not it
leads to a different conclusion on the merits.
To say this is of course not to make the absurd claim that white people all
agree with one another about racial profiling, or that African-Americans have the
same experiences and opinions about that complex issue. And in light of the fact
that members of all races contain people with a range of both favorable and
unfavorable views about racial profiling, it would be possible to respond that
any problem, if it exists, is not because the group is all-white, but if and because
its members begin with a uniform view of racial profiling. And if this is so, what,
if anything, is added by promoting diversity not of views but of racial
background? The answer must be that African-Americans, by virtue of their
experience, are able to add something to the discussion as such. And this seems
far from implausible. If students need to know something about the magnitude
and the experience of racial profiling, those who have been subject to such
profiling will be able to offer novel insights. And if African-Americans do, in
fact, have an unusually high degree of hostility to racial profiling, that is by itself
a point worthwhile to know and to try to understand. So too if they do not show
such hostility. Of course supplemental readings could be used to expose people
to diverse views. The value of diversity lies not simply in learning about facts,
but also in seeing a range of perspectives, including the emotions attached to
them—and in being in the actual physical presence of those who have those
perspectives, and perhaps cannot be easily dismissed.
These points might be used by a purportedly nondiscriminatory institution
to defend a set of policies designed to ensure a reasonable diversity of view in
classroom discussions. Because of the importance of a wide range of ideas to the
educational enterprise, the goal seems both legitimate and compelling. Are
affirmative action programs the least restrictive means of promoting that goal?
The answer depends on the nature of those programs. It is easy to imagine
See Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Reconteur, 44 Stan. L. Rev.
1217, 1217, 1220 (1992).
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cautious efforts, using race as a factor, in which the “least restrictive means” test
is indeed satisfied.388 And that point is sufficient to suggest that Justice Powell’s
approach is essentially correct.
To be sure, the same arguments about the importance of diverse views
might be enlisted very broadly, and in circumstances that might seem
unattractive. Imagine, for example, an effort, by a mostly African-American
university, to point to the need for diversity as a way of defending
discrimination against African-Americans and in favor of whites. Such a
university might claim that it wants significant representation by whites in order
to reduce the risks from group influences and to improve the quality of
discussion. It does indeed follow, from what I have said thus far, that this
argument is legitimate. A classroom that is entirely African-American might well
suffer from conformity effects and polarization; and a educational institution
might want to correct the situation. If courts should be suspicious of the
argument in this context, it is because they do not trust the sincerity of those who
make it. Courts might believe that the reference to diversity is actually a pretext
for an illicit discriminatory motive. But it is easy to imagine cases in which
diversity is the real concern and no pretext is involved.
There is a further complexity. Suppose that a university claims that it is
pursuing the goal of high-quality education. Suppose that it insists that its
admissions policies, which place a premium on many forms of diversity, are a
legitimate means of pursuing that goal. Such a university might well be willing
to discriminate in favor of members of racial minorities—and might well claim
that this form of discrimination is part of the neutral pursuit of high-quality
education. Is this illegitimate? Outside the context of affirmative action, the
Court has come very close to holding that it is.389 In making decisions about child
custody, courts are prohibited from taking account of the possible prejudice to be
faced by children of racially mixed couples. The prohibition applies even if it is
defended as part of a neutral mechanism for promoting the welfare of the
child.390 A racially-based system of child custody cannot be justified on the
ground that in light of existing social values, children do better in a family that is
all-white or all-African-American. This decision suggests that an institution is not
permitted to defend otherwise illegitimate discrimination by suggesting that it is
This was the conclusion of the court of appeals about the program used by the University of
Michigan Law School. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002).
389 See Palmore v. Sadoti, 466 US 429 (1984).
390 See id.
388
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neutrally pursuing a more abstract goal.391 But I am not claiming here that
affirmative action fails to count as discrimination. I am urging instead that
affirmative action can be adequately justified, in some contexts, as a way of
ensuring that educational institutions do what they are supposed to do.
It is important to emphasize the narrowness of the argument I am making.
In some cases, racial diversity is important for improving the educational process
within the relevant school. But in some cases, the claim seems extremely weak.
Would a mathematics class, or a course in physics, be improved if it contained a
degree of racial diversity? This seems unlikely. In principle, I do not believe that
courts should use the Constitution to scrutinize affirmative action programs with
great care.392 But the law is otherwise, and if courts are going to do so, they
should not offer a blanket ruling for or against a diversity rationale in higher
education. They should accept that rationale in the context of undergraduate
education, but not for programs for which racial diversity is not necessary to
promote a “robust exchange of ideas.” In the context of law school, the centrality
of racial issues to important aspects of legal education should be enough to allow
narrowly tailored affirmative action programs to survive constitutional
scrutiny.393
Conclusion
Human beings pay close attention to the informational and reputational
signals sent by others. These signals produce conformity, even in cases in which
many people have reason to believe, on the basis of their private information,
that others are mistaken or worse. Informational and reputational influences also
produce cascades, in which people do not rely on, and fail to disclose, the
information that they themselves have. Cascades and errors occur spontaneously
when people rationally take account of the decisions and statements of their
predecessors. Errors are magnified when people are rewarded for conformity—
and minimized when people are rewarded, not for correct individual decisions,
but for correct decisions at the group level.
Cascades, like conformity, are not a problem in themselves. Sometimes
cascades produce good outcomes, at least compared to a situation in which
On some of the complexities here, see David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986
Supreme Court Review 99.
392 See Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (2002).
393 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002).
391
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people rely solely on their own information. The real problem is that when
cascades are occurring, people do not disclose information from which others
would benefit. The result is that both individuals and groups can blunder,
sometimes catastrophically. Institutions involved in making, enforcing, and
interpreting the law are subject to conformity and cascade effects. The executive
branch has been shown to blunder as a result.394 We have seen that within courts,
precedential cascades are highly likely, especially in complex areas; and in such
areas, cascades tend to be both self-perpetuating and self-insulating.
The general lesson is clear. It is extremely important to devise institutions
that attempt to promote disclosure of private views and private information.
Institutions that reward conformity are prone to failure to the extent that they do
not do that; institutions are far more likely to prosper if they create a norm of
openness and dissent. The point very much bears on the risks of group
polarization. Groups of like-minded people are likely to go to extremes, simply
because of limited argument pools and reputational considerations. The danger
is that the resulting movements in opinion will be unjustified. It is extremely
important to create “circuit breakers”395 and to devise institutional arrangements
that will serve to counteract movements that could not be supported if people
had a wider range of information.
These points have implications for numerous issues in law and policy. I
have focused on a small subset of those issues here. We have seen that an
appreciation of social influences casts new light on the expressive function of
law. Simply by virtue of what it says, and even if it is rarely enforced, law can
affect the behavior of those who are unsure whether to engage in certain
conduct—and also the behavior of those who are unsure whether to challenge
those who engage in that conduct. Bans on smoking in public and on sexual
harassment are cases in point. Law’s effectiveness, in this regard, lies in its power
to give a signal about what it is right to do, and also to dissipate pluralistic
ignorance, by providing information about what other people think that it is
right to do. A legal enactment can operate in the same fashion as Asch’s
confederates and Milgram’s experimenter. Because people care about the
reactions of others, law’s expressive function will be heightened if the relevant
conduct is visible; bans on smoking in public places are an obvious example. For
the same reason, that function will be weakened if prospective law-breakers live
in a supportive subcommunity; consider bans on the use of narcotics. With an
394
395

See Janis, Groupthink, supra note, for a collection of examples.
See Eric Posner, supra note.
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understanding of social influences, we can therefore make some predictions
about when law is likely to be effective merely by virtue of what it says—and
about when law will be ineffective unless it is accompanied by vigorous
enforcement activity.
I have suggested that many of the Constitution’s institutions serve to
reduce the likelihood of bad consequences from conformity, cascades, and group
polarization. Such institutions increase the likelihood that important information,
and alternative points of view, will receive a public airing. The system of
bicameralism is the most obvious example, producing a system in which
lawmaking is done by two institutions with different cultures, thus creating a
potential check on unjustified movements. I have also urged that the framers’
most distinctive contribution consisted not in their endorsement of deliberative
democracy, which was uncontroversial, but in their commitment to
heterogeneity in government, seeing (in Hamilton’s words) the “jarring of
parties” as a method for “promoting deliberation.”
More controversially, I have suggested that an understanding of social
influences suggests the importance of ensuring a high degree of diversity on the
federal bench. It is foolish to pretend that Republican appointees do not, as a
class, differ from Democratic appointees; and we have reason to appreciate the
value, on any panel, of having a potential “whistleblower,” in the form of one
judge of a different party from the other two. Of course judges are rarely lawless,
but a group of like-minded judges is prone to go to extremes. An appreciation of
social influences on belief and behavior also supports the legitimacy of efforts to
promote racial diversity in higher education, at least where such diversity is
likely to improve learning.
Even if occasionally alarming, much of the behavior discussed here attests
to the reasonableness and good sense of ordinary people. In the face of doubt, we
do well to pay attention to the views of others.396 After all, they might know
better than we do. It is prudent to be cautious about challenging other people,
not only because they might be right, but also because people do not always like
to be challenged. Even in the most freedom-loving societies, people dissent at
their peril. A reluctance to disagree is not merely prudent; it is often courteous
too. But conformity creates serious dangers. Behavior that is sensible, prudent,
Note the suggestion, in Goldstein et al., supra note, at 174, that conformity operates as a
sensible heuristic, one that often works well but that sometimes misfires, see Henrich et al., supra
note, at 356–57.
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and courteous is likely to lead individuals and societies to blunder, simply
because people fail to learn about facts or opinions from which they would
benefit.
It is usual to think that those who conform are serving the general interest
and that dissenters are antisocial, even selfish. In a way this is true. In some
settings, conformists strengthen social bonds, whereas dissenters imperil them,
or at least introduce tension. But in an important respect, the usual thought has
things backwards. Much of the time, it is in the individual’s interest to follow the
crowd, but in the social interest for the individual to say and do what he thinks
best. Well-functioning systems of law and politics take steps to discourage
conformity and to promote dissent, partly to protect the rights of dissenters, but
mostly to protect interests of their own.
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